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The Efficient Queue and
the Case Against Dynamic Pricing
Ramsi A. Woodcock*
ABSTRACT: From surge pricing by Uber to last-minute fare increases by
airlines, the use of price hikes to determine who should gain access to scarce
resources has swept the business world in recent years, enabled by the easy
access to information on what consumers are willing to pay, and the power of
algorithms to act on that information, that characterizethe information age.
This practice, often euphemistically called dynamic pricing,has been defended
on the ground that higher prices are required to equilibrate supply and
demand. Lower prices, the argument goes, would lead to wasteful queuing.
In fact, the same technological advances that have enabled dynamic pricing
have also driven the cost of queuing nearly to zero, by allowingconsumers to
place orders online, which amounts to standing on instantaneously-selfclearing queues. Today, firms engage in dynamic pricing not because the
practice is better at rationingaccess to scarce resources, but because charging
higherprices is more profitable.Antitrust enforcers do not normally prosecute
the chargingof high prices, but they have an opportunity to do so here, because
the harmfulness of dynamic pricing to consumers is clear and the remedy
-- prohibitingdynamic pricing-would be relatively easy to administer.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Generations of introductory economics students have been taught that
prices clear markets, ensuring that the number of units of a good or service
demanded by consumers precisely equals the number of units supplied. And
yet the real world has always been rather obviously messier, as anyone who has
ever waited on line for a table at a restaurant, or found a child's favorite toy
sold out at Christmas, can attest. Firms sometimes accidentally set their prices
considerably below the level required to equilibrate supply and demand,
resulting in too many buyers given available supply, because firms have always
lacked sufficient information to identify that magic market-clearing price with
certainty.2 The archetypical example of undershooting is the old Communist
state-run enterprise, which charged prices so low that anyone could buy,
leading to interminable lines.3 But underpricing has always been pervasive in
all capitalist countries as well, though to a far lesser degree, with waiting lists,
preordering, reservations systems, sold out notices, and indeed lines a familiar
experience for shoppers everywhere..,
Waiting lists, preordering and the like are species of the same basic
solution to the problem of how to ration a resource for which price has been
set too low to equilibrate supply with demand. That solution is queuing, the
granting of access based on the principle of first-come-first-served.5
1.

See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN,

INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICs: A MODERN APPROACH

289-90 ( 7 th ed. 2oo6) ("The equilibrium price of a good is that price where the supply of the
good equals the demand. Geometrically, this is the price where the demand and the supply curves
cross.").
2.

See STEVEN ORLA KIMBROUGH, AGENTS, GAMES, AND EVOLUTION: STRATEGIES AT WORK

AND PLAY 193-98 (2011).
3.

SeeJANos KORNAI, TItE SOCIALIST SYSTEM: Ti tE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMIJNISM 287

(1992).

4. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, HurricanePrice GouginglsDespicabl, Right? Not to Some Economists,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2o 17/09/1 1/business/hurricane-pricegouging.html [https://perma.cc/62NX-VK2C].
5.
SeeYoram Barzel, A Theory ofRationing by Waiting 17J.L. &ECON. 73, 73, 75 (1974).
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Economists have long lamented the waste associated with queuing, from time
spent on lines that could have been spent on labor, to the resources wasted
by firms in managing reservations systems. 6 The arrival of the information age
has therefore seemed a godsend, giving firms the power to put an end to
shortages and queuing by allowing firms at last to identify the market-clearing
price. Vast amounts of data on consumers, generated by firms themselves
based on records of their own interactions with consumers, and purchased
from third-party data aggregators, allow firms to determine how many
consumers are able to pay each possible price for a product, and therefore to
identify the price that just clears the market.7
Charging that price empties all lines, sending a magical signal to
consumers that encourages hopefuls who cannot afford the price to disperse,
and beckons those who can afford the price to come forth to buy.8 In this
spirit, economists have celebrated the spread in recent years of dynamic
pricing throughout the economy, from Disney World, which now uses higher
prices to reduce lines during periods of peak demand, to commuter highways,
which are dynamically pricing their fast lanes, to cities considering charging
a "congestion price" for access to downtown, to Uber, which uses surge pricing
to handle the rush after concerts and games, and to Amazon, which varies
prices on thousands of products hundreds of times per day.9
The irony of the information age is that at the same time that information
makes the finding of market-clearing prices easier, information also reduces
the waste associated with queuing, eliminating the problem that the charging
of market-clearing prices was intended to solve. The information age has
greatly reduced the cost of selling based on the principle of first-come-firstserved, by allowing consumers to determine instantaneously, via online retail
platforms, whether an item is available for purchase or sold out. As an
increasing amount of commerce moves online from brick-and-mortar

6.

See id. at 73; VARIAN, supra note i, at 308.

7.
See Akiva A. Miller, What Do We Worry About When We Wony About PriceDiscrimination?The
Law and Ethics of Using Personal Informaionfor Pricing,19J. TFCH. L. & POL'Y 41, 44-54 (2014).

8. SeeVARIAN, supra note i, at 7-8, 306-07 ("At this price, each consumer who is willing to
pay at least p* is able to find an apartment to rent, and each landlord will be able to rent
apartments at the going market price. Neither the consumers nor the landlords have any reason
to change their behavior.").
9.
Sorkin, supra note 4; see Winnie Hu, Congestion PricingFalters in New York, Again, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 31, 20t8), https://www.nytimes.com/20 18/03/31 /nyregion/congestion-pricingnew-york.html [https://perma.cc/Z7KQ-6 4 5 4 ]; SK, Disney Discovers Peak Pricing, ECONOMIST

(Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.economist.com/free-exchange/2o16/o2/29/disney-discoverspeak-pricing [https://perma.cc/UP8A- 3 XWM]; Ben Popper, Uber Surge Pricing:Sound Economic
Theory, Bad Business Practice,VERGE (Dec. 18, 2013, 1 1:3 4 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2013

/ 12/18/5221428/uber-surge-pricing-vs-price-gouging-law

[https://perma.cc/CH6D-J6DM];

Harry Wallop, Iow Online Giants Like Amazon Can Rip You off by ChangingPrices up to 30 Times a
Year (And if You're Rich, Some Websites Could Soon Charge You Even More!), DAILY MAIL, http://

www.dailymai.co.uk/-/article-49
updated Oct. 2, 2017, 7:56 AM).

35

422/index.html

[https://perma.cc/X2RT-8NZZ]

(last
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locations, and service providers, from hair dressers to restaurants, increasingly
allow consumers to reserve services online, the cost of first-come-first-served is
falling across the economy.' 0 Consumers who might have wasted time on a
futile trip to a brick-and-mortar store, or trying to hail a taxi on a downtown
street, now use a phone or computer to learn immediately whether a good or
service is available. This "virtual queuing" rations supply on the principle of
first-come-first-served, just as cheaply as dynamic pricing rations supply using
market-clearing prices. Indeed, virtual queueing is cheaper because it does
not require that firms acquire any data on the prices that consumers are
willing to pay in order to be implemented effectively.
Why, then, has dynamic pricing spread across American industry, when
it has never been less wasteful to charge low prices and ration based on place
in line?" The answer, of course, is profit. Firms charge prices they think will
allow them to sell what they can produce, which means that when demand
turns out to be unexpectedly large, firms will lack the capacity to satisfy
demand."1 The firm cannot immediately adjust supply to correct, but must
wait for component orders to be filled, workers to be hired, and equipment
to be readied.'3 While the firm is waiting, the firm's supply is fixed, and the
firm must therefore decide how to ration out a supply that is too small to meet
demand.'4 If the firm raises prices to limit demand, the firm will end up
charging a price in excess of the cost of production, because the firm would
not have planned to supply the market at all if the firm had not expected to
See Kate Kaye, Walmart's Everyday Low Prices FaceAmazon's )ynamic PricePush, ADAGE (Dec.
http://adage.com/aricle/datadriven-marketing/walmart-s-everyday-low-prices-faceamazon-s-dynamic-push/30 1613 [https://perma.cc/M72D-EP6A] (discussing shift of brick-andmortar retail to online retail).
1o.

10, 2015),

See AP, 'Dynamic Pricing'Becoming More Popularin Many Industries, ST. AUGtJSTINE REC.

11.

(May it, 2o16, 2:18 PM), http://staugustine.com/news/national-news/2016-o5-1 i/dynamicpricing-becoming-more-popular-many-industries [https://perma.cc/EGA7-99SC]; Neil Irwin,
Why SurgePrices Make Us So Mad: What Springsteen, Home Depot and a Nobel Winner Know, N.Y. TIMES
4/upshot/why-surge-prices-make-us-so(Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2o 17/o/1

mad-what-springsteen-home-depot-and-a-nobel-winner-know.html

[https://perma.cc/NW8V-

G 9 C8]; Adam Tanner, Different Customers, Dfferent Prices, Thanks to Big Data,FORBES (Mar. 26,
2014, 6:oo AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/ 2014/03/26/different-customers-

different-prices-thanks-to-big-data/#39cf8e657305 [https://perma.cc/NSgA-JDGH]. See generally
Dax Cross, A Ilistosy of Revenue Management and the Advent of Next-Generation RM, 15 J. REVENUE &
PRICING MGMT. 293 (20 16) (discussing the development of dynamic pricing practices in travel,
hospitality, automotive, retail, cruise line, and entertainment industries); Robert G. Cross et al.,
Milestones in the Application ofAnalytical Pricingand Revenue Management, s oJ. REVENUE & PRICING
MGMT.

8

(201 1 )

(explaining the development of pricing and revenue management as a science);

Sheryl E. Kimes, The Evolution of lIotel Revenue Management, 15 J. REVENUE & PRICING MGMT. 247
(2016) (discussing the history of revenue management practices in the hotel industry, including
the "best available rate" pricing structure); Stefan Poelt, History of Revenue Management-FromLeg

to O&D, 15 J. REVENUE & PRICING MGMT. 236 (20 16) (analyzing the transformation of pricing

and revenue management in the airline industry).
12.
SeeVARIAN, supra note i, at 409-10.
13.
See id. at 402-o4.
14.

See Barzel, supra note 5, at 75.
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cover costs at prevailing prices.'5 The higher prices that the firm charges to
clear the market will therefore exceed cost, generating profit for the firm in
the economic sense of surpluses unnecessary to create an incentive for the
firm to produce., 6 Unlike queues, which ration based on first-come-firstserved, here price allocates goods or services only to that subgroup of
consumers, out of the group that is willing to pay the lower price that the firm
was initially planning on charging, who are willing to pay the most for the
product. As a result, the firm extracts the maximum possible profit from
consumers.'7
Introductory economics teaches that competition turns firms into "price
takers" that should be unable to raise their prices to ration supply during
periods when supply cannot be expanded to meet demand. But in the real
world, firms actually always have at least some power over the prices they
8
charge and the amounts they produce, even in fiercely competitive markets.'
Every firm sells a product that differs, at least in brand name, from all others.
Because at least some consumers care about these differences, and only one
firm is able to produce any particular differentiated product, each firm can
use price to ration access to its own product to the product's greatest fans at
the highest possible prices.,9 Consumer loyalty to the differentiated product
ensures that no other firm will be able to lure those fans away by selling the
exact same product at a lower price, as would happen in a world of perfect
competition, rather than the world of monopolistic competition in which
people actually live.20

The wealth-extractive character of ration pricing must be understood to
violate the antitrust laws, because, almost without realizing it, antitrust has
morphed in recent decades into a general defender of consumer welfare
against all attempts to redistribute wealth from consumers to producers in the
15.

SeeVARIAN, supranote 1, at 410-12.

16.
17.

See id.
See id. at 8.
Edward Chamberlin explains:

i8.

Under pure competition, the individual seller's market being completely merged
with the general one, he can sell as much as he pleases at the going price. Under
monopolistic competition, however, his market being separate to a degree from
those of his rivals, his sales are limited and defined by three new factors: (i) his price
....
The divergence of the demand curve for his product from the horizontal
imposes upon the seller a price problem, absent under pure competition, which is
the same as that ordinarily associated with the monopolist. Depending upon the
elasticity of the curve and upon its position relative to the cost curve for his product,
profits may be increased, perhaps by raising the price and selling less, perhaps by
lowering it and selling more. That figure will be sought which will render the total
profit a maximum.
EDWARD

HASTINGS

CHAMBERLIN,

TIlE

ORIENTATION OF THE TItEORY OF VALUE 71

19.
20.

See id. at 71-74.
See id.

THEORY

OF

MONOPOLISTIC

( 7 th ed. 1958).

COMPETITION: A

RE-
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form of greater profits.2, Since the 197os, antitrust has recognized the
protection of consumer welfare in the economic sense, understood to mean
the margin between the value the consumer derives from a product and the
price the consumer pays for the product, as the ultimate goal of antitrust
enforcement.2 This has resulted in an antitrust regime that today measures
2
legality in terms of the magnitude of harm inflicted by a firm on consumers. 3
For an antitrust obsessed with using consumer harm in the economic sense as
a rule of decision in antitrust cases, condemning dynamic pricing should not
be hard, as the point of dynamic pricing, at least when deployed in response
to unexpected surges in demand, is to increase the profits firms extract from
consumers, which is equivalent to harming consumers.
Antitrust has traditionally shied away from prohibiting the charging of
high prices, however, because courts are ill-equipped to respond by
determining and supervising the charging of lower prices.24 In the case of
dynamic pricing, this concern is absent because courts would not need to set
prices to provide a remedy for dynamic pricing. Instead, courts could simply
ban the practice. Courts need not know the costs of firms to know that prices
are too high under dynamic pricing, because the entire point of dynamic
pricing in response to surges in demand is to use ration pricing to increase
profits. Prohibiting dynamic pricing must therefore benefit consumers
without posing a danger of driving prices below costs.
A ban on dynamic pricing would be almost identical to the ban on price
fixing that is probably the most well-established rule in antitrust. 5 Like a ban

21.
SeeJohn B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting
Consumers, Not IncreasingEfficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 191, 192-97, 242 (2oo8) ("Congress
made clear that the fundamental goal [of the antitrust laws] is protecting consumers from
exploitation. Congress' principal objective, in other words, was to prevent firms from acquiring
or maintaining market power without justification and then using that power to raise prices to
consumers."); Steven C. Salop, Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard?
Answer: TheTrue Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 Loy. CONSUMERL. REV.336, 337-39 (2oo) ("The
true consumer welfare standard is indifferent to conduct that harms competitors-unless the
conduct also likely harms consumers. In contrast, the aggregate welfare standard is equally
concerned with the harm to competitors as it is to the benefits or harms to consumers and the
defendant firm ....Many courts and the federal enforcement agencies appear to have opted for
the true consumer welfare standard."); Ramsi A. Woodcock, TheA ntitrustDuty to Charge Low Prices,
39 CARDozo L. REV. 1741, 1755-6o (2018) [hereinafter Woodcock, The Antitrust Duty to Charge
Low Prices].
22.
(1993);

See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 219-27
Salop, supra note 21, at 338-47; Sandeep Vaheesan, The Evolving Populisms of Antitrust,

93 NEB.L. REv. 370, 395-403
23.

(2014).

SeeWoodcock, The Antitrust Duty to Charge Low Prices, supra note

2 1,

at 1755-60.

See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
-o8 (2004); Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Antitrust Duty to ChargeLow Prices, supra note 21, at 1747-48,
1763-64.
24.

25.

See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940); HERBERT

HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: TIlE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 254-55

( 5 th ed.

2o16).
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on dynamic pricing, the ban on price fixing prevents firms from using a
particular method-joint price setting in the case of price fixing-to set
prices.26 Like a ban on dynamic pricing, the ban on price fixing can be
enforced without judicial central planning, but rather by prohibition. As
would a ban on dynamic pricing, the ban on price fixing applies even without
proof of monopoly power, because firms that engage in price fixing always
have monopoly power.2 7 Firms do not bother to fix prices if they cannot make
a profit from fixing higher prices, and the ability to profitably raise price is all
that the monopoly power requirement demands, making it superfluous in the
case of price fixing.28 Similarly, firms do not seek to raise price to ration levels
during moments of fixed supply unless doing so is profitable. If they were
interested only in covering costs, firms could achieve that without raising
prices, simply by rationing access to their supply based on first-come-firstserved and continuing to charge the original prices that they chose when they
misjudged their output levels. So proof of monopoly power is superfluous in
the case of dynamic pricing as well.
To be sure, antitrust bans price fixing under a different provision of the
Sherman Act from that which would serve as the basis for condemning
dynamic pricing, but that is only because price fixing incidentally requires
cooperation with competitors, and the provision generally used to prohibit
price fixing has been held to prohibit collusive behavior in particular.9
Antitrust's consumer welfare standard applies to both provisions, however,
and antitrust has come in recent years to apply the same test to identify
violations of both provisions as well.30 If antitrust continues to ban price fixing,
it must also ban dynamic pricing in response to unexpected surges in
demand.3'
Part II defines dynamic pricing and shows how, when deployed in
response to unexpected increases in demand, dynamic pricing always harms
consumers and can be banned under the antitrust laws for that reason. Part
III refutes the objection that, by enabling the use of price to ration access to
scarce resources, dynamic pricing is efficient and should not therefore be
subject to antitrust condemnation. Part V considers the implications of this
analysis for the broader practice of using price as a rationing mechanism.
26.
See Socony- Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 221. The old ban on resale price maintenance was
another example of a ban on a method of setting prices. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc.

v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886-87, 907 (2007).
27.
See Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 221; ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS, AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 121 ( 3 d ed. 2017);
HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 21 1.
28.
See GAvIL ETAL., supranote 27, at 4 8 9 - 9o; HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 88-89.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); HOVENKAMP, supranote 25, at 171.
29.
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3 d 34, 58-6o (D.C. Cir. 2001 ) (per curiam);
30.
Salop, supra note 21, at 340, 345; see also TimothyJ. Muris, The New Rule of Reason, 57 ANTITRUST

L.J. 859, 859-61 (1988).
31.
SeeArizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 347-48 (1982).

IOWA LAWREVEW

1766
II.

Vol. 105-:1759

WELFARE EFFECTS AND ANTITRUST CONSEQUENCES

A.

DYNAMIC PRICING AND ITS SPREAD

Dynamic pricing is the use of information age tools, such as big data and
algorithms, to adjust prices based on new information over periods during
which output is fixed.32 The practice operates as a kind of salve, allowing firms
to use prices to minimize the losses they experience when they misjudge
consumer demand and accordingly have failed to produce the amount of
output that would maximize their profits. Ideally, a firm would respond to
such a mistake by adjusting both price and quantity supplied to the new profitmaximizing price and output levels.33 But historically the firm often could do
neither in the short run. Output, once produced, could not be unproduced,
and output not produced could not immediately be produced. Orders had to
be placed, workers hired, and machines run. And prices, once printed,
distributed, and posted, could not easily be raised or lowered.34 Once the
supermarket had put a sticker on a box of Cheerios, that box's price did not
change, unless supermarket employees went through the time-consuming
process of finding and covering over every price sticker.35 Once circulars
containing prices for electronics were printed, those prices did not change, at
6
least until another print run rolled around.3
The information age has solved half of this problem by allowing firms to
adjust prices almost instantaneously in response to changes in demand. It now
takes but a few electrons to change the online prices displayed to buyers.37
Data and algorithms allow firms to identify changes in demand, recalculate
prices accordingly, and transmit the new prices to consumers, with greater
speed than before.3s Online selling, and barcode scanning at brick-and-

32.

This is an original definition. More commonly, dynamic pricing is taken to mean only

the varying of prices over short time periods. See Tanner, supra note i i; Tim Walker, How Much
... ? The Rise of Dynamic and PersonalisedPricing,GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2017, i:oo AM), http://
www.theguardian.com/global/2o 17/nOv/2o/dynamic-personalised-pricing [https://perma.cc/
6NB6-7 V3J]; see also Cross, supra note ii, at 293-94.

33.
SeeVARIAN, supranote i, at 424-25 ("When there is only one firm in a market, that firm
is very unlikely to take the market price as given. Instead, a monopoly would recognize its
influence over the market price and choose that level of price and output that maximized its
overall profits.").
34.

See ALAN S. BLINDER ET AL., ASKING ABOUT PRICES: A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING

PRICE STICKINESS 226-53 (1998).
35-

See id.

36.
See id.
37.
See Wonseok Oh & Henry C. Lucas, Jr., Information Technology and PricingDecisions: Price
Adjustnwnts in Online ComnputerMarkets, 30 MIS Q. 755, 757-58 (2oo6).
38.
Alessandro Acquisti & Hal R. Varian, Conditioning Prices on Purchase Iisoy, 24
MARKETING SCI. 367, 367 (2005); seeARIEL EzRACHI & MAURICE STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION:
TIlE PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITIIM-DRVEN ECONOMY 89-1oo (2016); Hal R. Varian,
Online Ad Auctions, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 430, 430-32 (2009) [hereinafter Varian, Online Ad
Auctions].
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mortar stores, give firms data on the time, place, and amount of every
transaction consumers make.39 Credit or debit card purchasing, and loyalty

programs, allow firms to identify every buyer.4o Vast amounts of data on
browsing habits, collected by retailers themselves through their own websites,
and purchased from third-party web tracking firms, provide huge numbers of
additional data-points on buyers.4' Surveillance cameras with facial
recognition technology provide brick-and-mortar retailers with information
about in-store buyers.42 And vast amounts of data on economic trends,
gleaned from everything from the frequency of internet searches for certain
items, the prices and products listed by competitors online, satellite data on
the number of lights showing at night, and traditional macroeconomic time
series like the GDP jobs reports, now in easy-to-access digital form, provide
3
firms with additional information about consumer willingness to pay.4
Algorithms allow firms to parse their data quickly and use the results
automatically to adjust prices.44
Not surprisingly, given the power of this technology, dynamic pricing has
appeared to explode across the business world over the past decade, although
aggregate data on adoption does not yet exist. Uber is perhaps the most
infamous practitioner. The ride sharing service engages in "surge pricing,"
increasing ride prices when demand surges.45 Uber has argued that the higher
prices go in part toward offering drivers more money for driving during peak
periods, thereby increasing supply, but when sufficient drivers fail to
materialize, even after Uber offers more money to drivers, Uber continues to
charge the higher prices.46 That amounts to dynamic pricing, because it

39.

See Miller, supra note 7, at 44-54.

40.

See id. at 52.

41.

See id. at 5o; Benjamin Reed Shiller, First-DegreePrice Discrimination Using Big Data 6-7

(Brandeis Univ. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 58, 2014).
42.

See Miller, supra note 7, at 45; Nick Wingfield et al., Retailers Race Against Amazon to

Automate Stores, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2oi8/04/o/
technology/retailer-stores-automation-amazon.html [https://perma.cc/3EXR-E 5 CH].
43.
See EZRACHI c STUCKE, supra note 38, at 89-1 oo.
44.
See id. Firms may not even need to use data to tease out changes in demand, because the
information age has also turned the marketplace into a laboratory, in which firms can poke and
test consumers to determine changes in their willingness to pay without needing to consult
repositories of data about them. See Miller, supra note 7, at 47; Varian, Online Ad Auctions, supra
note 38, at 430-32. Firms can vary prices on their websites based on the time visitors spend on a
high-price page, relative to the time they spend on a low-price page, to try to infer willingness to
pay, for example. SeeMiller, supranote 7, at 53-54. When not testing consumers, firms can simply
manipulate them, using data to tailor advertising to individual consumers to lift their willingness
to pay. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 38, at 89-1OO; Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Obsolescence of
Advertising in the Information Age, 127 YALE LJ. 2270, 2278-81 (2o18) [hereinafter Woodcock,
The Obsolescence of Advertising in the Information Age]. I am grateful to Glenn Harrison for first
suggesting the connection between online auction techniques and data-driven pricing to me.
45.
See Popper, supra note 9; see alsoJonathan Hall et al., The Effects of Uber's Surge Pricing:A
Case Study, U. CHI. BOOTH SCH. Bus. 1-4 (2015).
46.

See Hall et al., supra note 45, at 4; Mike Murphy, Uber Got Two Economics PhDs to Explain
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means that Uber is raising prices faster than supply can adjust, allowing the
firm to extract additional profits from consumers due to the surge in demand.
But consumers are far more likely to have paid dynamically chosen prices to
Amazon than to Uber. Amazon has pioneered dynamic pricing in online
retail, and now varies the prices it charges for hundreds of thousands of goods
hundreds of times per day, a frequency that far exceeds the weeks required
for Amazon to refresh inventories.47 And the company is seeking to bring
dynamic pricing to brick-and-mortar retail, operating new physical stores that
have easy-to-change digital price tags.48 Airlines, which pioneered the use of
computers to generate prices back in the 1970s, have long engaged in a crude
form of dynamic pricing: charging higher prices for seats as planes fill up.49
The number of seats an airline can fly between two points is often constrained
by the availability of planes and airport gates. When airlines raise prices as
seats fill, they are engaging in dynamic pricing in the face of an anticipated
excess of demand over available supply.5o Much of the event industry, which
is in the same business of filling fixed numbers of seats, has followed suit in

How Supply and Demand Works, QUARTZ (Sept. 17, 2015), https://qz.com/505(31/uber-got-two-

economics-phds-to-explain-how-supply-and-demand-works [https://perma.cc/32FJ- 7 8UB].
47.
SeeKaye, supranote so (discussing Walmart's response to Amazon's changes in pricing);
Bill Snyder, Report Analyzes Amazon's Dynamic Pricing Strategy, CIO (Jan. 16, 2015, 6:1 5 AM),

https://www.cio.com/article/287o961/report-analyzes-amazons-dynamic-pricing-strategy.htrnl
[https://perma.cc/Q2YJ-E2P 4 ]; see also Kathy Kristof, tlow Amazon Uses "SurgePricing "Just Like
Uber, CBS NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/amazon-surge-pricing-are-you-getting-rippedoff-small-business [https://penna.cc/R8Y6-T2DX] (last updated July 24, 2017, io:o8 AM);
Ankitha Nagaraj, Shipping From China to Amazon FBA-Everything You Need to Know, SELLERAPP,
https://www.sellerapp.com/blog/how-to-get-your-shipments-from-china-to-amazon-fba [https://
perma.cc/3N39-3NTA]; Wallop, supranote 9.
48. Aly Weisman & Jeremy Dreyfuss, I Visited Amazon's First Retail Store, and One Thing Was
Especially Annoying, Bus. INSIDER (Dec. 3, 2015, 10:13 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
amazon-bookstore-doesnt-have-prices-2o 15-12 [https://perma.cc/TTU5-JXHL].
49. See Cross et al., supra note i 1, at 9-1 ; see also Cross, supranote 11, at 293-95.
50.
SeeCrossetal., supranote 1 i,at9- 1; seealsoPeterP. Belobaba&John L. Wilson, Impacts
of Yield Management in Competitive Airline Markets, 3 J. AIR TRANSPORT MGMT. 3, 4-6 (1997). High
airline ticket prices for last-minute travelers may not reflect dynamic pricing if the prices are the
product of a pre-determined bucket price schedule in which the last available seats on a plane
are placed in a high-price bucket. See Lars A. Stole, PriceDiscriminationand Imperfect Competition, in
3 HANDBOOKOF INDtSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2 2 23, 2 2 24-25 (Mark Armstrong & Robert H. Porter

eds., 2007).
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recent years, from Broadway shows to pop concerts.5' Ditto hotels, which now
dynamically price their limited inventories of rooms.52 Ditto sports.53

The list goes on. Services like YieldStar and LRO help apartment
communities vary apartment rental rates on a daily basis.54 Disney World now
raises ticket prices on days of high demand.55 A San Francisco startup tried to
dynamically price municipal parking spaces by occupying them and then
reselling them at a premium during period of excess demand.56 The city put
an end to those plans.57 But governments have not been immune to the
dynamic pricing frenzy. Dynamically-priced highway tolls, which increase
when demand spikes for the fixed-supply service that is highway access, have
proliferated over the past two decades.5 And New York City recently adopted

51.
See Steve Knopper, Taylor Swift's Ticket Strategy: Brilliant Business or Slowing Demand?.
ROLLING STONE (Apr. 9, 2018, 2:59 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/

taylor-swifts-ticket-strategy-brilliant-business-or-slowing-demand-6302i8
[https://perma.cc/4EP
9 -EBV5 ] ("Superstars like Swift are increasingly using 'dynamic pricing' that shifts ticket prices
constantly like airline seats."); see also Patrick Healy, Broadway Hits Make Most of Premium Pricing,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 201 1), http://www.nytimes.com/2oi /11/25/arts/new-pricing-strategymakes-the-most-of-hot-broadway-tickets.html [https://perma.cc/X7AM-46Yr]; How Are Ticket
Prices and Fees Determined?, TICKETMASTER, https://help.ticketmaster.com/s/article/How-areticket-prices-and-fees-determined ("In some instances, events on our platform may have tickets
that are 'market-priced,' so ticket and fee prices may adjust over time based on demand. This is
similar to how airline tickets and hotel rooms are sold and is commonly referred to as 'Dynamic
Pricing.'"); Michael Paulson, High Ticket Prices Are Fueling a Broadway Boom, N.Y. TIMES (May 23,
2017), https://www. nytimes.cOm/ 2017/05/ 2 3/ theater /high-ticket-prices-are-fueling-a-broadway-

boom.html [https://perma.cc/2JLV-EJTP]. Broadway was pushed into dynamic pricing in part
by the rise of automated ticket scalpers, which bet on demand for shows by buying up tickets and
then raising prices if demand turns out to exceed supply. SeeJames B. Stewart, Broadway Tickets,
for the Price of an Economics Lesson, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2017/o6
/o8/business/broadway-theater-ticket-prices.html
[https://perma.cc/WA6C-B3SA]; see also
RobertJ. McFadden, Note, The BOTS Act: A Small Step for Fankind When a Giant Leap Is Needed, 55

WASHBURN L.J. 427, 427-29 (2016). Whether the show or the scalper does it, consumers suffer.
Congress has responded to scalping with legislation, but it is not clear why scalpers should be
sanctioned but original sellers should not when they engage in the same practice. See McFadden,
supraat 428-29.
52.
See Cross et al., supranote i , at 1 1-16; see also SUNGJIN CHO ET AL., OPTIMAL DYNAMIC
HOTEL PRICING 5-6 (2018).
53.
See Stephen L. Shapiro &Joris Drayer, A NewAge ofDemand-BasedPricing:An Examination
of hynamic Ticket Pricing and Secondary Market Prices in Major League Baseball, 26 J. SPORT MGMT.
532, 533-35 (2012).
54. See NOWSHABA AHMED ET AL., APPLICATIONS OF REVENUE MANAGEMENT IN APARTMENT
RENTAL INDUSTRY 17-22, 30, available at https://personal.utdallas.edu/-metin/0r6377/
Reports/RMforApartments.pdf [https://perma.cc/25A9-RVML].

55.

See S.K, supra note 9.

56.

See Eliana Dockterman, Appfor SellingPublicParkingSpots Suspends Service in San Francisco,

TIME (July i t, 2014), http://time.com/2974647/monkeyparking-parking-space-app-suspended
[https://perma.cc/J 7 LM-4 LDU].
57.
See id.
58.
SeeYingyan Lou et al., Optimal Dynamic PricingStrategiesfor High-Occupancy/TollLanes, 19
TRANsP. RES. PART C 64, 64-65 (201 1); BartJansen, 'Diynamic Tolls': How Highways Can Charge$40

for Driving Just io

Miles, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/12/
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a congestion plan for downtown Manhattan that allows for dynamic pricing
of vehicular access to city streets.59

But what all this new technology cannot do is to help a firm adjust the
other factor that a firm must change in order to maximize profits in the face
of an unexpected shock to demand: the quantity of output that the firm
supplies. The information age has not enabled firms to make excess
production disappear, or missing production appear much more quickly than
it could be made to appear before. A pair of sneakers or an ironing board
cannot be conjured into existence much more quickly than it could be in
2000 or 201o. Dynamic pricing therefore does not fully solve the economic
problem of imperfection in firms' information about demand. But it does
allow firms to mitigate the problem by adjusting prices to maximize profits
conditional on fixed, and indeed suboptimal, output levels in the short run.
This mismatch between the flexibility of price and the inflexibility of supply
in the short run, has important consequences for the antitrust treatment of
dynamic pricing.
B.

EXPLOITING AN AN7ITRUST LooPiioLE TO HARM CONSUMERS

Dynamic pricing can be good for consumers when firms use it to react to
demand that is lower than expected at the original price that the firm planned
to charge. The firm might find it profitable to lower prices, for example, to
bring more buyers into the market, and lower prices are good for
consumers. 60 Even if the firm uses dynamic pricing to raise prices, the
increases may be necessary to help the firm cover fixed costs that can no
longer be covered at the original price given reduced demand, an outcome
that may keep the product on the market in the long term. 6'
But dynamic pricing does not have these benefits when firms use it to
react to unexpected increases in demand, the context that is the subject of
this Article. Unexpected surges in demand cannot lead to lower prices
because if demand exceeds supply at the original price, then demand will
surely exceed supply at lower prices, as more consumers enter the market
seeking to take advantage of the discount. Thus, all that dynamic pricing can
do in response to surges in demand is raise prices. 62 But unlike in the context
of demand that falls below expectations, price increases here are never
oi7/states-govemments-increasingly-turn-tolls-manage-highway-traffic- jams/93o9o000i [https://
perma.cc/7EMN-X 9 QA] (last updated Dec. 8, 2017, 11:52 AM) ("Fortyjurisdictions nationwide
have adopted tolls that fluctuate depending on traffic congestion since Southern California
adopted the first one in 1995.").
SeeVincent Barone, Congestion PricingPasses, but Without Key Details, AMNY (Apr. 1, 2019),
59.
https://www.amny.com/transit/mta-congestion-pricing-cuomo- 1-292 09432 [https://perma.cc

/2CMZ-DE 5 P]. For more on congestion pricing, see Winston Harrington et al., Overcoming Public
Aversion to Congestion Pricing,35 TRANSP. RES. PART A 87, 87-89 (200 1).
SeeVARIAN, supra note s, at 249-5(.
6o.
See id. at 435-37.
61.
62.

Seeid. at412-15.
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necessary to cover fixed costs, because the firm will have already chosen the
original price to cover costs, including fixed costs, and since demand exceeds
supply, the firm could still sell its entire inventory at the original price and
cover its costs.63 Any price increase must therefore be in furtherance of abovecost pricing, meaning the extraction of profits, in the economic sense, from
consumers. 64 Thus dynamic pricing, when used to respond to unexpected
surges in demand, is always harmful to consumers. As a result of dynamic
pricing, some consumers pay higher prices that the firm does not need to
charge in order to remain in the market, because the prices are above costs,
with costs understood in the economic sense to mean all payments, including
dividends to shareholders, necessary to make the firm ready, willing, and able
to serve the market.6 5 And other consumers may be priced out of the market,

66
if the firm raises prices high enough.
The fact that the firm is able to alter its prices at all may seem strange to
those who continue to treat the perfectly competitive market as a touchstone
in thinking about economics. But power over price is common to virtually all
firms, because all firms sell products that are differentiated relative to other

63. It is sometimes argued that above-cost prices are required to allow firms to make up for
unfortunate periods during which they have failed to cover their costs due to low demand. See
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 77, 88-9o (1994) ("Practically
any investment entails, as a necessary complement of entrepreneurial action, certain
safeguarding activities such as insuring or hedging.... In analyzing such business strategy ex visu
of a given point of time, the investigating economist or government agent sees price policies that
seem to him predatory and restrictions of output that seem to him synonymous with loss of
opportunities to produce. He does not see that restrictions of this type are, in the conditions of
the perennial gale, incidents, often unavoidable incidents, of a long-run process of expansion
which they protect rather than impede."). But this argument reflects a misunderstanding of the
definition of economic cost. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS
ANALYSIS 593 (4 th ed. 1977) [hereinafter BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY]. That cost includes a risk

adjustment, which means that unit cost charged when demand is healthy is bulked up to provide
a cushion for times when demand is not healthy. See id. To argue that above-cost pricing is always
required to provide for lean periods is to argue that it is impossible for a firm to earn profits in
the economic sense of revenues in excess of all expenditures required to guarantee production,
including the cost of insuring against lean periods. See id.; Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Antitrust Case
for Consumer Primacy in Corporate Governance, 1o U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 22-30) [hereinafter Woodcock, Antitrust as Corporate Governance], available at

https://ssrn.com/abstract= 3 123985. And yet it seems obvious that some firms do earn profits
-revenues that are simply not necessary to sustain production-even after accounting for risk.
SeeRICHtARDA. BREALEY ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 280-90 (8th ed. 2006). Apple's $268 billion

cash hoard appears, for example, far more than Apple might ever have needed to sustain a lean
period. See Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form so-K) 49 (SepL 30, 2017), available at https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/32o193/oooo32o193 1700007o/aio-k2o17

9 3 o2o17.htm

[https://perma.cc/TP7 7 -NDS3 ].
64.

See VARIAN, supranote 1, at 412-15 ("Economic rent is defined as those payments to a

factor of production that are in excess of the minimum payment necessary to have that factor
supplied.").
65.

66.

See BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 63, at 593.
SeeVARIAN, supra note i, at 431-33.
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products in the market, if only based upon time and place of sale. 67 It follows

that because some consumers will prefer a particular product's unique
characteristics over the characteristics of other products, and be willing to pay
more for them, every firm has the power to profitably raise prices, at least by
very small amounts.

68

In this monopolistically-competitive world, competition

from similar, but still different, products limits the power of firms to raise
prices, but can never eliminate that power entirely. 69 It follows that all firms
charge monopoly prices in the sense of prices they choose to maximize their
profits in light of existing demand.7o Moreover, unless firms' fixed costs are
very high, all firms generate profits, in the sense of revenues in excess of their
costs in the economic sense, precisely because they have the power to choose
the prices they charge.7, The firm that underestimates demand would not
therefore have sold its products at a perfectly competitive price, a price equal
to marginal cost, if the firm had properly predicted demand.72 The price and
quantity the firm chooses are meant by the firm to be the monopoly price and
quantity, not the competitive price and quantity.73 It follows that a firm's use
of dynamic pricing to increase prices and profits when the firm's initial price
and quantity choices prove mistaken, cannot in itself constitute a problem for
the antitrust laws, any more than the quotidian charging of monopoly prices
by sellers of differentiated products constitutes a violation of the antitrust
laws.74

Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization, defined as
conduct by a single firm having monopoly power that tends to create or

67.
See CIAMBERLIN, supra note 18, at 56-57 ("Differentiation may be based upon certain
characteristics of the product itself, such as exclusive patented features; trade-marks; trade names;
peculiarities of the package or container, if any; or singularity in quality, design, color, or style. It
may also exist with respect to the conditions surrounding its sale. In retail trade, to take only one
instance, these conditions include such factors as the convenience of the seller's location, the
general tone or character of his establishment, his way of doing business, his reputation for fair
dealing, courtesy, efficiency, and all the personal links which attach his customers either to
himself or to those employed by him.").
68.
See id. at 71.
69.
See id. at 68-70.
70.
Seeid. at 7.
71.
See id.
72.
SeeVARIAN, supra note 1, at 386-87.
73.
See id. at 424-25.
74.
See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1956) ("A
retail seller may have in one sense a monopoly on certain trade because of location, as an isolated
country store or filling station, or because no one else makes a product of just the quality or
attractiveness of his product, as for example in cigarettes. Thus one can theorize that we have
monopolistic competition in every nonstandardized commodity with each manufacturer having
power over the price and production of his own product. However, this power that, let us say,
automobile or soft-drink manufacturers have over their trademarked products is not the power
that makes an illegal monopoly. Illegal power must be appraised in terms of the competitive
market for the product."). For the antitrust laws, see, inter alia, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012).
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maintain a monopoly.75 But the antitrust laws do not prohibit the monopoly
power created by differentiation, and in fact encourage it, so long as firms
differentiate their products by improving them, rather than by degrading the
products of competitors.76 That is because product improvements are
innovations, and innovation is widely accepted as the principal driver of
economic growth and gains for consumers in the long run. 7 7 Antitrust
normally addresses monopoly power by ordering an end to the practices that
create the power, but antitrust cannot do that in the case of product
differentiation without putting an end to innovation, something that would
harm consumers.78 But that does not mean that the power created by product
differentiation, as distinct from the benefits of product improvements, is not
harmful to consumers. It is. For while the power created by product
differentiation may allow innovators to charge prices that cover fixed costs
associated with research and development, there is no reason to suppose that
the power always naturally stops there.79 Firms often acquire, from innovation,
the power to charge prices far in excess of what they need to cover their
costs.so Every penny they earn in excess of cost represents a pure

75.

15 U.S.C. § 2; United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); United
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945).

States v. Aluminum

76.
See Aluminum Co. of Am., 1 4 8 F.2d at 4 30 ("A single producer may be the survivor out of
a group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry. In
such cases a strong argument can be made that, although, the result may expose the public to
the evils of monopoly, the Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces which
it is its prime object to foster: finis opus coronat. The successful competitor, having been urged
to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins."); GregoryJ. Werden, IdentifyingExclusionary
Conduct Under Section 2: The "No Economic Sense" Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 419 (2oo6)
("[C] ourts have refused to entertain the notion that merely introducing a new product.., could
violate Section 2."); see also DANIELJ. GIFFORD & ROBERT T. KUDRLE, TIlE ATLANTIC DIVIDE IN
ANTITRUST: AN EXAMINATION OF US AND EU COMPETITION POLICY 28 (2015); HOVENKAMP, supra
note 25, at 417-18; Richard Schmalensee, Thoughts on the Chicago Legacy in U.S. Antitrust, in HOW
THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ON U.S. ANTITRUST 11, 12-14 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2oo8); Woodcock, The Obsolescence of
Advertising in the Information Age, supra note 44, at 2311.
77.
See Kenneth J. Arrow, Workshop on the Economy as an Evolving Complex System: Summary, in
THE ECONOMY AS AN EVOLVING COMPLEX SYSTEM: THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE EVOLUTIONARY
PATHS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY WORKSHOP 275, 281 (Philip W. Anderson et al. eds., 1988)
(discussing that innovations "have contributed more to per capita economic growth than any
other factor").
78.
See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 27, at 1379 ("The most common remedy in
prosecutions is termination of the unlawful conduct.").

civil

79.
See Ramsi A. Woodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 105, 126-36
(2013) [hereinafter Woodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust] (showing that even after taking fixed
costs associated with innovation into account it remains possible for a monopolist to charge an
above-cost price); cf David J. Teece & Mary Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analysis
in High-Technology Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 8o, 820-22 (1998) (distinguishing the profits
generated as a result of innovation from monopoly profits).
8o.
See Teece & Coleman, supra note 79, at 820-2 2 ("There are a number of factors that
prevent competitors from appropriating the rents from innovation instantaneously .... An
obvious one is that much of the knowledge at issue may be highly tacit, rendering the
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redistribution of wealth from firms to consumers, a payment not necessary to
8
keep the firm in the market. ,'
Ideally, antitrust would solve the problem of differentiation's power by
enjoining innovators from charging above-cost prices. But the antitrust laws
are not meant to be rate regulation by courts, and judges shy away from the
debates over how to define costs, and the ongoing supervision, associated with
enjoining firms to charge lower prices.8 2 So the antitrust laws have, for lack of
an alternative, treated monopoly power derived from product differentiation
as exempt, an approach I have called "innovation primacy."s3
C.

Tim, CASE FOR PER SE ILLEGALITY

UNDER THE ANI1TRUST LAWS

While the power that makes dynamic pricing possible comes from
product differentiation, making it indistinguishable from the power all firms
normally exercise without violating the antitrust laws, there is a remedy
uniquely available for dynamic pricing that does not involve putting an end
to product differentiation, and all of differentiation's associated benefits:
prohibition. Prohibiting dynamic pricing would allow firms to continue to
improve and differentiate their products, while preventing firms from raising
their prices above costs in response to surges in demand. And, unlike a
general prohibition on above-cost pricing, a prohibition on dynamic pricing
would not require firms to dabble in the difficult business of ascertaining the
costs of firms or setting the prices firms charge. That is because dynamic
pricing in response to demand surges is always above-cost pricing.84 Banning
the practice simply forces firms to continue to charge at-cost prices in
response to surges in demand, effectively forcing firms, as will become clear
in Part III, to sell out of their inventories instead of exploiting temporary
scarcity to extract more profits from consumers. By focusing on and banning
the practice of adjusting prices over time periods that are shorter than those
required to alter a firm's output, antitrust enforcers can stop a practice that
always leads to above-cost pricing without needing to know what a firm's costs
actually are and without needing to dictate the prices that the firm must

product/process difficult to imitate. Secondly, the knowledge at issue may not be observable in
use, and so reverse engineering is not feasible as an imitation pathway. Furthermore, the
process/product in question may enjoy a certain amount of intellectual property protection,
rendering imitation more costily, and possibly impossible (in the case of a broad-scope patent),
at least for a period of time.").
8i.

See BAUMOL, ECONOMIc THEORY, supra note 63, at 593.

82.

See HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 393-94

83.
SeeWoodcock, The Obsolescence ofAdverlising in theInformationAge, supra note 44, at 231.
For the argument that courts should respond to this problem by symbolically condemning the
charging of above-cost prices and awarding plaintiffs only nominal damages, see Woodcock,
Antitrust as Corporate Governance, supra note 63, at 44-54; and Woodcock, The Antitrust Duty to
Charge Low Pices, supra note 21, at 1744-49.
84.

See supraSection II.B.
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charge. 85 By contrast, a general prohibition on above-cost pricing by firms
selling differentiated products would require courts to do both of those
things, which is why the courts generally refuse to regulate prices under the
antitrust laws. 8 6 Because prohibiting dynamic pricing does not actually involve

direct price regulation, the courts' rationale for not intervening in the pricing
decisions of firms simply does not exist in the dynamic pricing context.
The administrability of a ban on dynamic pricing gives the courts an
opportunity to protect consumers from the harmful side effects of the power
created by product differentiation. And antitrust's consumer welfare standard
requires that the courts act.87 That standard, current since the 1970s, holds
that the mission of the antitrust laws is to protect consumer welfare in the
economic sense against harms arising from anticompetitive

conduct. 88

Product differentiation is anticompetitive, in the sense that it gives a firm's
products characteristics that competing products lack, putting those
competing products at a competitive disadvantage.8 9 But product
differentiation is only harmful to consumers when the firm uses the power
that product differentiation's anticompetitive aspect confers on the firm to
raise prices above costs.90 Otherwise, differentiation benefits consumers, by
giving them improved products that they prefer.9, It follows that antitrust's
consumer welfare standard requires that antitrust laws intervene, whenever
possible, to prevent firms from exploiting the power differentiation gives
them to raise prices, without preventing firms from engaging in the act of
differentiation itself.92 Prohibiting dynamic pricing gives the courts an
opportunity to use the antitrust laws to do just that.
Antitrust's developing doctrine of less restrictive alternatives, which the
courts apply today in reviewing virtually all conduct challenged under the

85. See W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 539-46 ( 5 th ed.
2018) (discussing challenges associated with regulating rates); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note
25, at 392-93.
86. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 4o6
-07 (2004) (expressing disapproval of rules that force "antitrust courts to act as central planners,
identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing-a role for which they are illsuited").
87.
See Salop, supra note 2 1, at 336-38; Woodcock, The Antitrust Duty to Charge Low Prices,
supranote 2 1, at 1755-6o.
88. See Salop, supra note 21, at 336-38.
89. SeeWoodcock, The Obsolescence ofAdvertisingin the Information Age, supra note 44, at 2309.
o
9 . See Woodcock, Inconsistency inAntitrust, supra note 79, at 1 26-36.
91.
See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The PracticalReason for Both
Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, o Loy.CONSUMER L. REv. 44, 46 (1997) ("The essence of
consumer sovereignty is the exercise of choice. By choosing some goods or some options over
others, consumers satisfy their own wants and send signals to the economy. It is, therefore, critical
that the exercise of consumer choice be protected.... [E]ffective consumer choice requires two
things: options in the marketplace and the ability to select freely among them." (emphasis
omitted)).
92.
Cf Woodcock, The Antitrust Duty to ChargeLow Prices, supra note 21, at 1755-6o.
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antitrust laws, shows why the consumer welfare standard demands a
prohibition on dynamic pricing.93 According to that doctrine, the courts
decide whether to condemn anticompetitive conduct that, like product
differentiation, benefits consumers, by asking whether the defendant has
chosen to pursue the conduct in a way that minimizes harm to consumers.94
If the firm has pursued the conduct in that way, meaning that the firm has
pursued the conduct in a way that is less restrictive with respect to the welfare
of consumers, then the court will stand aside and impose no liability.95 But if
instead there is a less restrictive alternative to the conduct actually pursued by
the firm, then the court will impose liability.96 Exploiting the power created
by product differentiation to charge above-cost prices is not a less restrictive
way of pursuing production differentiation. That instead would be to
differentiate and then charge at-cost prices. So exploiting differentiation to
charge above-cost prices violates the less restrictive alternatives standard and
should always give rise to antitrust liability.97 The courts do not actually
condemn above-cost pricing as a general matter in these circumstances only
because of the absence of an administrable remedy.9g Because banning
dynamic pricing is an administrable remedy for the peculiar form of abovecost pricing that is dynamic pricing into a surge in demand, the
administrability bar is removed and less restrictive alternatives analysis
therefore requires that courts condemn the practice.
Normally, courts would treat dynamic pricing under antitrust's default
rule of reason, which would require that every instance of dynamic pricing be

93.
See C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 1 16 COLUM. L. REV.
927, 938-39 (2o6).

94.
See id. at 929, 937 ("A... tool for handling
to a hypothesized alternative and ask whether the
particular sense that it is 'less restrictive.' If so, then
apply less this restrictive alternative . .. test widely,
monopolization to mergers.").
95.

mixed conduct is to compare the conduct
alternative action is less harmful in the
the defendant loses. Courts and agencies
from agreements in restraint of trade to

See id at 937.

96.
See id. ("The LRA inquiry fits a common analytical pattern-that the restraint goes too
far compared to its justification. The issue is sometimes described as overinclusiveness. More
informally, courts speak of swinging a sledgehammer to crack a nut, firing a cannon to shoot a
sparrow, or 'burn [ing] the house to roast the pig.' The alternative might be superior because it
harms fewer consumers or because it harms them all to a lesser degree. Similar moves appear in
other legal fields that confront mixed conduct, most famously in constitutional law, which
scrutinizes a justification for state action in light of alternative means of achieving the goal."
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
97.

See id.

98.

SeeWoodcock, The Obsolescence ofAdvertising in the Information Age, supra note 44, at 2311.

The determinative role played by administrability is illustrated by the courts' prohibition on
naked price fixing, a different pricing practice that is also used to exploit power created by
product differentiation. SeeUnited States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940);
HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 340-41. The ban on price fixing, like a ban on dynamic pricing,

is administrable. Similarities between the two pricing practices are discussed immediately
following this footnote.
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evaluated independently to determine whether the practice gives rise to
consumer harm.99 But the unambiguity of the harm created by dynamic
pricing should not only deliver dynamic pricing from innovation primacy, the
exemption generally allowed for pricing practices associated with product
differentiation, but actually place dynamic pricing at the other extreme of the
antitrust laws: in the category of practices for which case-by-case analysis under
the rule of reason is not required because the conduct is condemned as illegal
per se.' ° ° Under the consumer welfare standard, a practice is illegal per se
when it always or almost always harms consumers, a characteristic that most
certainly exists in the case of dynamic pricing into surges in demand.10 There
is no need for courts to undertake an analysis of the effects of dynamic pricing
on consumers in each case in which the practice may be challenged, because
basic economic theory establishes that the practice must always harm
consumers when applied in response to a surge in demand over a period when
supply is fixed.- o A court need only ascertain that a firm sets prices
dynamically, and that the firm experienced an unexpected surge in demand,
in order for the court to be absolutely certain that the firm exploited power
arising from product differentiation to harm consumers. 0 3 That makes
dynamic pricing the perfect candidate for per se treatment.

99.

SeeUnited States v. Microsoft Corp.,

253

F.3 d 34, 58-6o (D.C. Cir.

2001)

(per curiam)

("[T]o be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist's act must have an 'anticompetitive effect.'
That is, it must harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers. In contrast, harm to
one or more competitors will not suffice. 'The [Sherman Act] directs itself not against conduct
which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy'
o
competition itself."' (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Muris, supra note 3 , at
859-61. Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, this rule of reason approach would also require
proof of monopoly power. Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3 d. at 58-60.
1oo.
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 254-55. The "per se" label is generally only applied
to bans of coordinated conduct under Section i of the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012);
Werden, supra note 76, at 418 n.21. But there is no reason why the per se concept, and the rules
underlying its application, cannot be applied to single firm conduct under Section 2. SeeWerden,
supra note 76, at 42o. Another advantage of per se treatment is that plaintiffs would not need to
provide the proof of monopoly power normally required to prevail on a Section 2 claim. See
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); Microsoft Corp., 253 F. 3 d at 5o-5 1.
101.
See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (stating
that per se illegality is appropriate only if a "practice facially appears to be one that would always
or almost always tend to restrict competition"); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.,
485 U.S. 717, 723-24 (1988).
102.

See supra Section II.B.

See supra Section II.B. Distinguishing dynamic pricing in response to surges in demand
from dynamic pricing in response to unexpected shortfalls in demand would be important,
because, as discussed in Section I.B, dynamic pricing in response to shortfalls in demand can be
good for consumers, enabling firms to raise prices to cover costs or to lower them to attract more
business, making both firms and consumers better off. Distinguishing the two kinds of dynamic
pricing should not be too hard, because evidence of surge-oriented pricing could be found in
dynamic pricing software, or confirmed by the defendant's software engineers. Attempts by firms
to mask the practice by, for example, overproducing on purpose, so that demand would always
appear unexpectedly to fall short of supply, would be costly for firms, making such a strategy unlikely.
103.
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Indeed, dynamic pricing has many characteristics in common with the
archetypical example of per se illegal conduct in antitrust: naked price fixing,
the joint setting of prices by competitors unaccompanied by any other joint
conduct, such as joint investment in new product development, that might
make the joint price setting necessary.' 0 4 Probably the most important
similarity is that both are pricing practices, rather than examples of
anticompetitive conduct, and so the fact that the antitrust laws condemn price
fixing establishes that the antitrust laws can target practices, such as dynamic
pricing, that exploit monopoly power, and not just practices that create
monopoly power. Naked price fixing has the superficial appearance of
anticompetitive conduct because when a firm chooses to fix prices, the firm
stops competing based on price. But the ability of any two firms to fix higher
prices is actually limited by the extent to which the two firms' products are
differentiated from those of competitors in ways that consumers prefer.'05 The

°6
better the firms' products are, the higher the prices that the firms can fix.
The less differentiated the firms' products, the lower the prices the firms can
fix. 07 So the power of any two firms to fix higher prices is actually identical in
source to the power of an individual firm to raise prices based on product
differentiation.,o 8 What firms do when they fix prices is not, from this
perspective, to create monopoly power, for that is already latent in the
differentiation of their products in relation to others, but rather to exploit
that power through the methods they use to set their prices, namely the
agreement between them to set the same prices.'°9 Thus naked price fixing,
like dynamic pricing, is a pricing practice aimed at exploiting power
generated through other means, and so the ban on price fixing sets an
important precedent for a ban on dynamic pricing.
Another similarity between naked price fixing and dynamic pricing is
their prohibition does not force the courts to measure costs or set prices,
delivering both from the administrability concerns that normally prevent
antitrust from regulating firms' pricing practices. ° The courts understand
that firms have no incentive to employ price fixing to reduce prices, because
lower prices mean lower revenues, and so the courts are confident that if firms
fix prices, they must fix higher prices.' To ban the practice, then, the courts

104.

See HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 255-57.

105.

SeeWoodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust, supra note 79, at 145 n.103; see also GAvIL ET AL.,

supra note 27, at 8o3--06 (making an equivalent observation in the merger context).
Io6. See GAVIL ETAL., supra note 27, at 803-06.
107.

Io8.
o9.

See id.
See id.
See id.

1 1o.
See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
-o8 (2004).
(1940).
Ili.
See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 3 1o U.S. 150, 220-21
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need only to ascertain that firms have reached an accord on price."l 2 The
courts do not need to know what that price is, what the firm's costs are, or the
actual magnitude of the difference between the firms' costs and the price
fixed. 1'3Similarly, courts can ban dynamic pricing of demand surges without
inquiry into the nature of the dynamic prices actually charged, because firms
only have an incentive to use dynamic pricing, in response to a demand surge,
to raise prices.' 4
If anything, the logic justifying the ban on price fixing is actually weaker
than the logic supporting a ban on dynamic pricing, because market prices
can fall below costs, and when that happens firms could conceivably use price
fixing to raise prices up to cover costs, rather than to extract profits from
consumers.' '5 In this case of "ruinous competition," price fixing could save
firms from bankruptcy and thereby benefit consumers, weakening the
argument that price fixing almost always harms consumers." , 6 It is of course
possible that a firm engaged in dynamic pricing might be locked in a similar
ruinous struggle with competing firms, but unlike price fixing, dynamic
pricing will not help the firm to escape that struggle and cover costs, because
the firm will continue to face competition from other firms in the market
while the firm is engaged in dynamic pricing, limiting the ability of the firm
to use dynamic pricing to increase prices."l7 And because dynamic pricing
takes place in the context of short-run limitations on supply, a firm's dynamic
pricing, though it will permit increases in price relative to the price the firm
initially chooses based on the firm's incorrect projections regarding demand,
can never generate as much income net of variable costs for the firm as the
firm would have earned had itjudged demand properly." 8 As a result, a firm
id.

112.

See

113.
114.

See id.
See supra Section II.A.

115.

See MICHAEL D. WtIJNSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 16-17, 38 (2oo8)

("Can this ruinous competition argument be dismissed as being simply illogical and
preposterous? Like many proposed justifications for price-fixing arrangements, the answer is in
fact no. The railroad industry is one of high fixed costs .
).
i16. See id.
117. This follows from the fact that when firms selling differentiated products compete, the
effect of competition is to reduce demand for each firm's products as competitors siphon away
business from each other. SeeVARIAN, supra note i, at 459-63. It follows that as demand falls due
to competition, the ability of a firm to raise prices falls as well. See id. In the limiting case in which
firms sell identical products, demand curves become flat and the firm becomes unable to raise
prices at all. See id.
1 18. This follows from a kind of syllogism associated with the definition of the profit
maximizing price and quantity of output. See id. at 424-25. A firm selling a differentiated product
has power over the prices charged and quantities sold of that particular unique product. See id.
at 459-63. The firm uses its projections regarding demand to choose price and quantity to
maximize the surplus generated by the firm, net of variable costs, a quantity economists
sometimes call "quasi-profit," because fixed costs have yet to be deducted from it. See id. at 424
-25. When the firm discovers its demand projections to be flawed, the firm can only adjust prices
dynamically in the short run, but not output, so the firm lacks one of the degrees of freedom
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suffering losses due to ruinous competition will never be able to use dynamic
pricing to escape ruin. The most that can be said in such a situation is that
dynamic pricing would help mitigate losses due to bad projections regarding
demand that would compound the losses the firm would have experienced
anyway due to the ruinous competition. Thus the case against dynamic pricing
lacks one of the principal weaknesses of the case against price fixing.,9
The case for banning dynamic pricing is stronger than the case for
banning naked price fixing also because dynamic pricing is easier to identify,
and therefore to prosecute, than is price fixing. The communications that
give rise to the agreement necessary to identify an instance of price fixing can
consist in no more than a meaningful look, or a few words of code., 20° They
are fleeting and difficult to record. 2 Dynamic pricing, by contrast, requires
the creation and maintenance of an IT infrastructure programmed to adjust
prices in response to unexpected surges in demand with a frequency that

exceeds the frequency with which supplies of the firm's products may be
replenished. 22 The speed with which a firm can refresh inventory is easily
ascertained from a firm's own inventory data. And the rest of the evidence is
in the software that adjusts prices in response to new information about
demand, and in the software technicians required to tend to that software.L23
Put these observables together-inventory refreshment times substantially
above zero and a dynamic pricing infrastructure-and the inference of
dynamic pricing follows immediately. Where in the case of price fixing it is in
some sense necessary to get inside the heads of the officers of different
corporations to determine whether they have struck an agreement, it is only
necessary, in the case of dynamic pricing, to get inside an algorithm.s4
necessary to choose the profit-maximizing price and quantity given actual, revealed demand, and
so the firm cannot maximize profits with respect to actual demand. Because the firm can use
dynamic pricing to charge higher prices, the firm will increase its quasi-profits relative to the
quasi-profits the firm expected to generate under its mistaken assumptions about demand. See
supra Section II.B. But the firm can never do better than it would have done had the firm
projected demand correctly. If competition is ruinous, then the firm's quasi-profits, had the firm
accurately predicted actual demand and chosen the profit-maximizing price and quantity, would
have been insufficient to cover fixed costs, and so afortiorithe firm will be unable to use dynamic
pricing in the aftermath of an inaccurate prediction of demand to generate sufficient quasiprofits to cover fixed costs.
119.

SeeWHINSTON, supra note 115, at 16-17, 38.

See GAVIL tET AL., supra note 27, at 312-15 ("Skillful, well-disciplined cartels minimize
the creation of incriminating written records and strive to hide their illicit activities from
employees within their own firms.").
See id.
121.
See supra Section I.A.
122.
123.
Cf Ramsi A. Woodcock, Personalized Pricing as Monopolization, 51 CONN. L. REV. 311,
331-32 (2019) [hereinafter Woodcock, PersonalizedPricingas Monopolization] (arguing that the
similar need for an infrastructure to carry out personalized pricing makes that practice relatively
easy to observe and condemn as well).
124. See EzRAciii & STtJCKE, supra note 38, at 230-32. But see FRANK PASQUALE, TilE BLACK
12o.

Box SOCIETY: TtE SECRET ALGORITHMS TI IAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 8-9 (2016).
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The ability to observe the dynamic pricing infrastructure itself is helpful,
because inferring dynamic pricing from price changes themselves would be
difficult. The reason is that dynamic pricing is difficult to distinguish, based
on price changes alone, from the conceptually distinct practice of
personalized pricing.!5 Personalized pricing is the tailoring of prices, ideally
at the individual or unit level, based on past information about demand, in
contrast to the price adjustments based on new information about demand
undertaken by dynamic pricing.12 6 Personalized pricing can look like dynamic
pricing because in order to charge consumers personalized prices based on
past information about consumers' willingness to pay, it is necessary, unless
all customers buy at the same time, to change the prices at which products are
offered over time based on the identity of the shopper making a purchase.7
Thus, personalized pricing requires the constant adjustment of prices
overtime, just as dynamic pricing does. '2 The distinguishing feature of
dynamic pricing, that the price changes are based on new information about
demand and not old information about the identity of purchasers, cannot be
inferred from the rate of change of prices alone. Distinguishing the two
practices may not ultimately be important for antitrust, however, because, as
I argue elsewhere, personalized pricing too should be understood to violate
the antitrust laws.'29

Dynamic pricing into demand surges undoubtedly redistributes wealth
from consumers to firms, but it can also do something else that lends it the
patina of efficiency, and calls into question whether banning dynamic pricing
would be good for the economy, or required by the antitrust laws: Dynamic
pricing facilitates rationing during periods of scarcity. If the alternative to
rationing with price, which is to let firms' products sell out on a first-comefirst-served basis, is inefficient, then consumers might be better off under
dynamic pricing, and condemnation inappropriate.

125.
SeeWoodcock, Personalized Pricingas Monopolization, supra note 123, at 313-15; see also
Ramsi A. Woodcock, BigData,Price Discrimination,and Antitrust, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1388-91
(2017) [hereinafter Woodcock, Big Data,PriceDiscrimination.,and Antitrust].
126.
This is an original attempt to distinguish the two concepts. A looser distinction, one that
seems to drive usage of the two terms in the literature, takes dynamic pricing to be the varying of

prices over short time periods and personalized pricing to be a subcategory of dynamic pricing
in which the variation over time is based on the identity of the consumer. Compare CHO ET AL.,
supra note 52, at 4, with COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
U.S., BIG DATA AND DIFFERENTIAL PRICING 4 (2015).

See Miller, supra note 7, at 47; Stole, supra note 5o, at 72.
See supra note 127.
129.
See Woodcock, Personalized Pricing as Monopolization, supra note 123, at 318-21. My
arguments for banning personalized pricing follow a different path through the antitrust laws
than do my arguments for banning dynamic pricing. But because my arguments for banning
dynamic pricing are premised on the certainty of consumer harm arising from them and the ease
of administering a ban, and personalized pricing also harms consumers with certainty and would
be easy to ban, my arguments for banning dynamic pricing support a ban on personalized pricing
with equal force. See id. at 318-21, 362-69.
127.

128.
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III. THE ALLOCATION PROBLEM
A.

DYNAMIC PRICIN(;AS RATIONING WITI PRICE

Dynamic pricing's defenders argue that the practice equilibrates supply
and demand. 3o° Uber, for example, claims that surge pricing is just market
forces at work.:3' When demand increases, argues Uber, prices must rise
because the marginal cost of bringing more rides to market rises.,32 Drivers
must be induced to drive into the surge from distant places, or to rouse
themselves from bed, and that costs money.33 This story would be true if the
price changes executed by dynamic pricing took place on the same timescales
over which firms are able to adjust supply.'34 If Uber drivers in fact were to
flood markets shortly after Uber raises prices, then dynamic pricing would
represent market forces in action-prices adjusting to levels that ensure that
the maximum amount of output for which buyers are willing to pay the cost
of production in fact is produced and distributed to buyers.
But, as turns out to be the case for Uber, and really for all firms engaged
in dynamic pricing, given the near-instantaneous changes in price that
dynamic pricing makes possible, supply does not in fact adjust in response to
dynamic pricing.135 The rate of change in prices far outstrips the ability of
firms to increase supply, and so dynamic pricing does not operate to
equilibrate supply and demand.136 Indeed, the inability of supply to adjust to
the demand surge in the short run is precisely what it means for demand
unexpectedly to exceed supply: A truth that is even clearer to recognize in the
retail, airline, hospitality, or events industries, for which the time required for
supply to increase is measured in weeks or even years, than in the case of Uber,
for which supply increases may be a matter of quarters of an hour (though
still too slow for dynamic pricing to operate as an equilibrator of supply and
demand for rides). '7 Economists sometimes argue that even if the price
increase does not trigger a contemporaneous increase in supply of the firm's

130.

See Sorkin, supra note 4.

131.

See Popper, supra note 9; see also Hall et al., supra note 45, at 1-4.

132.

See Hall et al., supra note 45, at 1-4.

133.

See id.

134.

See id.

See Nicholas Diakopoulos, ttow Uber Surge PricingReally Works., WASH. POsT (Apr. 17,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2o 15/04/1 7 /how-ubersurge-pricing-really-works [https://perma.cc/7BH9-Z2LJ]; see aLso LE CHEN ET AL., PEEKING
(finding that contrary to Uber's claim that
BENEATH THE HOOD OF UBER 495, 5o5-o6 (2015)
135.

20o15,

11: 19 AM),

surge pricing increases the number of drivers by 70 to 8o percent, surge pricing increases the
number of new drivers by only 3.7 percent on average, and appears to cause current drivers to

leave the surge area); Nagaraj, supra note 47.
136.

SeeKaye, supranote 1o; Kristof, supranote 47; Nagaraj, supranote 47; Snyder, supranote

47; Wallop, supra note 9;.
137.

For these other industries, see supra Section H.A. For the time required for a driver to

respond to an Uber surge, see Hall et al., supra note 45, at 2-3.
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own products, the price increase does signal to competitors, who may have
inventories of similar products in storage, that they can turn a profit by quickly
bringing their products to market, effectively increasing supply to meet the
higher demand.138 But it is not at all clear why such supply would not be
unlocked anyway without dynamic pricing by the signal created when the firm
sells out of its inventory at the original low price. Both higher prices and sold
out signs speak of profit opportunities for competitors in possession of supply.
And so it cannot be said that dynamic pricing has any more of an equilibrating
function than its alternative. Dynamic pricing is a matter of something quite
different from the equilibration of supply and demand.
Instead, dynamic pricing rations.,39 Unless the surge in demand is very
large, dynamic pricing uses price increases to determine who, out of the
surging group of consumers who are willing to pay the initial price the firm
wanted to charge for its inventory, and who are therefore willing to pay at least
the cost of production, will ultimately gain access to the firm's limited
inventories in the short term.,4o The firm raises price until the quantity
demanded just equals the firm's available inventory, effectively rationing
access to the inventory to the group of consumers who are willing to pay the,
most for

it.'4,

That is not the same thing as equilibrating supply and demand,.

which would require the firm to do the impossible, under conditions of fixed
supply, and choose a price that ensures that the entire surging group of
consumers, who are willing to pay the cost of producing the firm's products,
are able to purchase them.,42 Dynamic pricing is not productive, but rather
purely allocative here. Firms do not, of course, impose dynamic pricing out of
a civic desire to allocate scarce resources in an orderly manner, but rather out
of a desire to profit: Ration pricing also happens to be profit maximizing, as
discussed in Part II.'43

138.
139.

SeeVARIAN, supra note i, at 289-90.
For an overview of rationing in economics, see WILLIAMJ. BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS:
APPLICATIONS AND THEORY 75-95 (1986) [hereinafter BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS].
140. If the surge in demand is extreme, then the profit-maximizing price that the firm
charges might be so high that the firm does not sell out of its inventory. Instead, the firm holds
some of its inventory back in order to keep the price of the other units the firm sells as high as
possible. That represents an artificial restriction on output that lacks any efficiency justification.
Dynamic pricing that enables a firm to magnify the scarcity associated with an unexpected surge
in demand by holding back available supply harms consumers, both those who pay the higher
prices and those who are priced out of the market and must violate the antitrust laws for the
reasons outlined in Part II. Accordingly, this easy case will not be considered further here.
141.
See id. at 2-3; VARIAN, supranote i, at 15-16.
142. See VARIAN, supra note 1,at 289-9o.
143. See supra Section II.B.
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THE WEAKNESS OF THE CASE FOR RATIONING WITHPRIC

Willingness to Pay vs. Place in Line as Proxies for Desire

But ration pricing could also be efficient, in the sense that the alternative
of not raising prices and just allowing the good to sell out on the basis of firstcome-first-served might actually so harm consumers, relative to dynamic
pricing, as to make consumers worse off in a world in which the antitrust laws
were to prohibit dynamic pricing, even after taking into account the lower
prices consumers would pay without it. The heart of this line of defense, and
a source of great intuition for economists, is the notion that allocating scarce
resources to those who are willing to pay the most for them allocates resources
to those who actually place the highest value on them.,44 If that is the case,
then any alternative that might allocate resources to those who are not willing
to pay the most for them, as the alternative of queue rationing would likely
do, may ultimately be harmful to consumers as a group.'45 Banning dynamic
pricing would amount to taking scarce resources from those who derive the
greatest pleasure from them, and giving the resource to others who enjoy
them less.' 6 Now, the fact that under a ban prices would be lower might
compensate for the loss of enjoyment caused by the misallocation. The
surplus enjoyed by any consumer depends not only on the value the consumer
places on goods, but also on the prices the consumer must pay for them, so
the surplus generated by giving a good to a consumer who enjoys it less might
not fall if the price the consumer pays for the good falls by even more.,47 But
if queue rationing misallocates, the effect of dynamic pricing on consumer
welfare is no longer unambiguously harmful, and the case for banning the
practice disappears. 148

The intuition that ration pricing allocates resources better than does
queuing serves as the foundation for laissez faire in a vast number of industries
characterized by fixed supply, and not only those in which ration pricing is
carried out dynamically. Consider finance. Windfall gains associated with
speculation in securities or commodities are an example of ration pricing.
The short-run supply of a particular security or commodity is fixed over the
near-instantaneous periods of time during which speculators trade, and
rather than sell out of the asset at cost, including a reasonable return on
investment, the speculator insists instead on using higher prices to ration
access to the asset.'49 The justification for permitting speculators to extract

144.

SeeVARIAN, supra note t, at 15-17.

145.

See id.

146.

See id.

See id. at 249-50.
For the importance of the unambiguity of the harm of dynamic pricing into demand
148.
surges to the antitrust case for banning dynamic pricing, see supraSection I.C.
149.
See Eric Budish et al., The High-Frequency TradingArn Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a
Market Design Response, 130 QJ. ECON. 1547, 1548-49 (2015).
147.
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such profits is that in doing so speculators allocate the asset to the party that
places the greatest value on it. 15o The logic of ration pricing similarly suggests
that the owner of valuable real estate who insists on selling only to the highest
bidder is making a social contribution, by ensuring that the property is
allocated to the buyer who places the highest value upon it.151 From this
perspective, arbitrageurs, too, appear to have the same virtuous function
when they buy low and then sell high during a national catastrophe. Their
behavior, which looks like hoarding and price gouging to some, is actually
efficient, according to this view, because the behavior ensures that goods in
scarce supply are sold to the highest bidder, and the highest bidder must be
the person who places the highest value on the good.152 Otherwise, why would
the highest bidder be willing to pay so much for the good?
The trouble with this logic is of course that a consumer's willingness to
pay is not a perfect measure of the value the consumer places on a good.
Happiness cannot yet be measured, and so all methods of allocating scarce
resources, including rationing with price, must employ a proxy.53 The
argument in favor of rationing with price as the best method of allocating
scarce resources therefore turns on the question whether willingness to pay is
a better proxy for happiness than the proxy used by queuing, which is
willingness to get on line first.'54 And the answer to that question is by no
means obvious. Willingness to pay is of course a function not just of desire,

150. According to defenders of speculation, this causes asset prices to accurately reflect the
true value of financial assets, because when speculators ration with price, they drive the price of
the asset up to the maximum price that the market is willing to pay for the asset, which must,
according to the view that willingness to pay is a proxy for value, be the maximum value that
society places on the asset. See John F. Barry Il, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule
iob-5 , 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1307, 1316-19 (1981) ("Under these conditions, securities prices
should continuously reflect all available information, leading to greater accuracy in the pricing
of individual securities and to a more efficient allocation of resources. When stocks and their
prospects for success or failure are evaluated by a process that reflects all available information,
investors can more rationally compare competing companies.").
It is not, however, clear why having prices accurately reflect the true value placed on an
asset by the market is a good thing. In order for production to take place, and for assets to be
brought to market, in an efficient manner, it is necessary only that the prices of assets be high
enough to cover their production costs, not that they equal the maximum value that buyers place
upon them. See BAUMOL, ECONOMIc THEORY, supranote 63, at 593. Assuming, that is, that nonprice alternatives to rationing access to assets for which demand exceeds supply do as good ajob
as ration pricing at allocating the assets among those who are willing to pay the cost of production.
This assumption is considered in detail in the passages immediately following this footnote.
SeeVARIAN, supra note i, at 15-17.
SeeJ.D. Tuccille, Price-GougingLaws Will Do More Harm Than Good During the Coronavirus
152.
Pandemic, REASON (Mar. 16, 202o, 8:45 AM), https://reason.com/2020/03/1 6/price-gouging[https://perma.cc/S99Claws-will-do-more-harm-than-good-during-the-coronavirus-pandemic
5 BR7].
See EUGENE SILBERBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF ECONOMICS: A MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS 4
153.
151.

-6 (2d ed. 199o).
154.

See Barzel, supra note 5, at 73.
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but also of wealth.55 As between a rich and a poor consumer who derive the
same utility from a good, the rich consumer will be willing to pay more for it,
because the rich consumer's wealth ensures that the rich consumer must give
up fewer of the other things that the rich consumer cherishes in order to pay
a higher price for the good.5 6 Spending more, for the rich consumer, means
perhaps a slight reduction in the inheritance the consumer can pass on to
children, whereas for the poor consumer, spending more might mean less
food to eat tomorrow.57
By contrast, the proxy employed by queue rationing, place in line, has no
more obvious flaws than does willingness to pay. Place in line proxies for value
to the extent that consumers who place the highest value on a good will line
up first for it.'58 This proxy, like willingness to pay, is imperfect. A wealthier
consumer, or an older consumer, might have an advantage in the race to
queue, because the wealthy and the old often have more leisure time than
others.59 If the queue is physical, those who happen to live closer to the queue
may have an advantage, whereas if the queue is an online ordering system,
then those with faster computers have an advantage., 6° But it is by no means
obvious that these defects in place in line as a proxy for value are more serious
than the defects associated with willingness to pay. The most that can be said
is that they differ.
In
terrorem arguments regarding queuing in the Soviet Union
misunderstand the nature of the queuing alternative to ration pricing. 6,The
alternative to ration pricing is not to have no prices at all, or to impose belowcost prices, and then to allocate goods to those who get on line for them first,

155.

See SILBERBERG, supra note 153, at 396-402; VARIAN, supra note i, at 141-42; see also

BAtUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 63, at 498-500.

156.

See BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 63, at 501.

157.
See id. at io-9i. This might not be a problem if wealth and poverty were to serve as
incentive mechanisms, rewarding those who contribute the most to society and punishing the
lazy and untalented, sacrificing short-run consumer welfare in order to reward productivity that
benefits consumers in the long run. Giving access to scarce resources to those who work the
hardest, or who contribute the most to society, as measured by their wealth, rather than to those
who value the goods the most, might create incentives to productive labor that make everyone
better off in the long run. But few believe today that the prevailing distribution of wealth reflects
such a mechanism. See Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Anlitrust, Competition Policy, and
Inequality, 104 GEO.L.J. ONLINE 1, 2- 5 (2015).
t58.

See Barzel, supra note 5, at 73.

159.
See id. (discussing the advantage of the poor in waiting on lines because the poor have
a lower "time-cost").
I6o.

See Budish et al., supra note 149, at 1548-49.

161. See KORNAI, supra note 3, at 228-45 ("Unless lucky, [the shopping of a woman in a
socialist system] is not a single action but a process, a sequence of decisions .... [E]vent i, beef
is available, but customers must queue for it. This is a familiar occurrence; under classical
socialism customers very often have to queue. For some goods there is an actual, 'physical' queue
at the counter or outside the store ... [T]he good she seeks may not be available at all, either
immediately or after queuing. In that case she must choose from a further set of alternatives.").
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as occurred in the Soviet Union.' 62 The alternative to ration pricing discussed
here is for the firm to charge a price equal to the firm's cost of production in
the economic sense, inclusive of a reasonable return on investment, and only
then to allow the good to sell out. In the context of dynamic pricing into
surges of demand, the queuing alternative is for the firm to continue to
charge the original price and allow the good to sell out on the basis of firstcome-first-served, instead of using dynamic pricing to ration access to the
good., 63 Because buyers still must pay the costs of production, consumer
willingness to pay continues to determine which goods are produced and
which are not. If the willingness of consumers to pay the costs of production
of a particular good ceases, then the firm will stop producing that good.
Queuing, as understood here, therefore does not undermine the ability of the
price system to dictate the long-run production decisions of firms.' 6 4 Queuing
here serves only to determine how goods for which consumers are willing to
pay the costs of production are allocated among only those consumers who
are in fact willing to pay those costs, when fixity of supply makes it impossible
to distribute the good to the entire group.
2.

Queues as Markets and Markets as Queues

Unable to show that willingness to pay is necessarily a better proxy for
value, economists sometimes fall back on the argument that queuing always
devolves into ration pricing anyway, because consumers will use money to
undermine any queuing system.165According to this view, consumers who are
willing to pay the most for a good will hire others to wait on line, or buy the

162.

See id.

163.

See supra Section lI.C.

164.

See KORNAI, supra note 3, at 228-45.

165.

See RobertT. Deacon &Jon Sonstelie, The Welfare Costs of Rationingby Waiting, 27 ECON.

INQUIRY 179, 179-80 (1989) ("[U]nless the first come/first served rule is precisely specified,
consumers will compete for available supplies in ways other than waiting."). Greg Mankiw put it
thus:
High prices are a natural reflection of great demand and scant supply. In a free
market, in which private individuals can engage in mutually advantageous gains from
trade, they are inevitable until demand subsides or supply expands.
The comedian Jay Leno learned this lesson some years ago. In 2009, while the
economy was suffering through the Great Recession, Mr. Leno, a car enthusiast,
generously performed two free "Comedy Stimulus" shows for unemployed workers
near DetroiL
Yet zero is not, as economists put it, the equilibrium price to see a live
performance by Jay Leno. Some of the unemployed who received free tickets tried
to turn around and sell them on eBay for about $8oo. When Mr. Leno learned about
this, he objected, and eBay agreed to take down offers to resell the tickets.
N. Gregory Mankiw, I Paid$2,500 for a 'familton' Ticket. I'm Happy About It., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2 1,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2o16/10/23/upshot/i-paid-2 5 oo-for-a-hamilton-ticket-imhappy-about-it.html [https://perma.cc/K7RC-PAAK].
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66
fastest computers to win the race to be first to place online orders.
Consumers competing to undermine the queue will spend until the effective
price they pay for the good, taking into account expenditures on
undermining the queue, equals the price that would be used to ration based
on willingness to pay. Only a group with a demand equal to supply will be able
to afford that level of expenditure, because the ration price is precisely the
price that equilibrates supply and demand, and that group will presumably,
thanks to its expenditures, be at the head of the line. Indeed, only the same
consumers who would purchase the good at a ration price will be able to
afford to be the first on line to obtain the good through queuing, so the
outcome of queuing turns out to be identical to the outcome of ration pricing,
with one important exception. Unlike in the case of ration pricing, in which
the profits generated by the high price are not wasted but only transferred
from consumers to firms, the equivalent expenditure on undermining the
queue is wasted., 67 The person hired to wait on line could have been put to
work moving goods, or doing some other useful thing, and those
supercomputers could have been put to work curing cancer. It follows,
according to this objection, that direct ration pricing is better.
The defect in this way of thinking is that all rationing systems may become
the target of wasteful attempts to undermine the system, including a rationing
system based on price. Wealth may well help some get there first, but getting
there first is very often also the key to amassing great wealth.168 It is not the
first person to invent, but the first person to file a patent application who gets
the wealth that can come with patent ownership, for example, and so it may
be said that it is the queuers, the early birds, who are forever undermining the
price system, amassing the wealth that allows them to out-bid others and
effectively transform all price rationing schemes into queuing schemes.b69
Sometimes this queuing-for-wealth is socially useful, as when an early patent
filing hastens a product to market, but queuing-for-wealth sometimes may be
wasteful.'70 The additional resources expended in the quest to be first-to-file,

166.

SeeVISCUSI ET AL., supra note 85, at 684-87.

See id.
See F.M. Scherer, First Mover Advantages and Optimal Patent Protection, 40 J. TECi.
168.
TRANSFER 559, 56 1 (2015) ("[T] he first to market a new product often engrains in the minds of
167.

consumers an 'image' of superiority-that is, a product differentiation advantage-allowing it to
retain a substantial market share while charging prices appreciably higher than those realizable
by latecomers."); see also F.M. SCIIERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 626-30 ( 3 d ed. 199o) ("[B]eing first to bring a new product onto the

market, with or without patent protection, often confers a substantial reputational advantage over
imitators, permitting the innovator to maintain elevated prices while defending a sizeable market
share.").
See MarkJ. Patterson & M. Andrew Pitchford, First to File, TENN. B.J., Nov. 201 1,at 14-15.
169.
170.
See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 . POL. ECON. 807,
809-1 2 (1975) (arguing that the most significant form of waste caused by monopoly arises from
attempts by firms to achieve and defend monopolies). Posner explains that:
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for example, may have no effect on time-to-market, if another inventor would
have filed only a few hours or days later.i7 Those additional resources are
wasted.
More generally, all expenditures on obtaining first-mover advantages that
are not strictly necessary to create an incentive to productive behavior are
wasteful attempts to gain an advantage in price rationing.172 People strive to
be the first to market in order to get rich, and thereby to obtain priority of
access to goods in fixed supply. It is not immediately clear that the waste in
resources arising from the struggle to queue for wealth is greater than the
waste would be from the struggle of the wealthy to buy their way onto lines.
Of course, the law may be used to reduce wasteful queuing-for-wealth by, for
example, altering the patent system to ensure that the first person to invent,
rather than to file, gets the patent. 73 But the law may also be used to restrict
the power of wealth to undermine queuing. Banning the hiring of others to
stand on line, or the use of fast computers for virtual lines, limits the power
of wealth over queues.' 71
C.

THE Low COST OF QuEuNG IN

THE INFORMA TION AGE

Before the information age, ration pricing still had one important virtue,
relative to queuing, despite the absence of any reason to suppose that ration
pricing is the best way to allocate resources to those who value them the most.
That virtue was a low cost of implementation.75 Subject to the important
caveat that information on precisely what price clears the market is available,
rationing with price is inexpensive to implement because merely posting the
price is sufficient to induce consumers to sort themselves based on willingness
to pay. 76 By posting a price that is high enough that the number of consumers
willing to pay the price just equals available supply of the good, the seller can

Obtaining a monopoly is itself a competitive activity, so that, at the margin, the cost

of obtaining a monopoly is exactly equal to the expected profit of being a
monopolist. An important corollary of this assumption is that there are no
inframarginal monopolies-no cases, that is, where the expected profits of
monopoly exceed the total supply price of the inputs used to obtain the monopoly.
If there were such an excess, competition in the activity of obtaining the monopoly
would induce the competing firms (or new entrants) to hire additional inputs in an
effort to engross the additional monopoly profits.
Id. at 8o9.
171.
See Brad Pedersen & Vadim Braginsky, The Rush to a First-to-FilePatent System in the United
States: Is a Globally Standardized Patent Reward System Really Beneficial to Patent Quality and
Administrative Efficiency , 7 MINN.J.L. Sci. & TECH. 757, 765-66 (2oo6).
172.
SeePosner, supra note 170, at 8o9-1 2.
173.
See Pedersen & Braginsky, supranote 171, at 766-69.
174.

See McFadden, supra note 51, at 428-29.

175.
See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 85, at 684-87; Barzel, supra note 5, at 73; Deacon &
Sonstelie, supra note 165, at 179.
See VARiAN, supranote i, at 7.
176.
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be sure to distribute the good only to those consumers who are willing to pay
the most for it, because only those consumers will show up to buy the good at
8
that price.'77 By contrast, before the internet, queuing could take time.,7
Buying a child a popular toy for the holidays, for example, meant waiting on
line before the store opened in the morning, not logging in to Amazon to
place a pre-order. Reservations systems, which reduce the cost of queuing by
allowing consumers to save a spot on line, were imperfect and burdensome
on firms. Taking a number, as at the Department of Motor Vehicles, could
save consumers the trouble of actually queuing up, but still required that
consumers remain on premises. Phone-based reservations systems required
staffing and paper record keeping.
The irony of the information age is that at the same time that information
has finally made it possible for firms to use dynamic pricing to avoid the costs
of queuing when demand surges, the information age has also all but
eliminated the cost of administering queues, eliminating the advantages of
dynamic pricing.' 79 In the information age, the costs of queuing have been
driven very near zero, and will continue to fall as the internet completes its
colonization of the brick-and-mortar world, because the time it takes to wait
on line online for a good in short supply at an online retailer is very near
zero., 8o Some will log in and obtain the good, while others will fail to obtain
the good, but no time will be wasted waiting for a result. Online ordering is,
in other words, low-cost queuing. The consumer logs in, and finds any desired
good either available or sold out. As soon as the line is entered, it is done.
True, some will face a "sold out" notice, but that is not inefficiency. Those
turned away by a high price under ration pricing face a "sold out" sign as well,
in the form of the high price those consumers cannot pay.',' From the
8
perspective of cost, the two approaches are now nearly identical., 2

177. See id.
178. See Barzel, supra note 5, at 73; Robert T. Deacon &Jon Sonstelie, Rationing by Waiting
and the Value of Time: Results from a NaturalExperiment, 93J. POL. ECON. 627, 627-28 (1985); Deacon
& Sonstelie, supra note 165, at 18o; see also Cotton M. Lindsay & Bernard Feigenbaum, Rationing
by Waiting Lists, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 404, 404 (1984).
179.
For another irony of the information age, see Woodcock, The Obsolescence of Advertising
in the InformationAge, supra note 44, at 2274.
18o. See Wngfield et al., supra note 42.
t81.
See VARIAN, supra note 1, at 7.
182.
Southwest Airlines' boarding system presents an example of how the information age
can eliminate the cost of queuing. See Boarding the Plane, SOUTrwEsr, https://ww.
southwest.com/html/generated/help/faqs/boarding-the-plane-faq.html
[https://perma.cc/
DCK9 -Z6S 5 ]; see also David C. Nyquist & Kathleen L. McFadden, A Study of the Airline Boarding
Problem, 14 J. AIR TRANSPORT MGMT. 197, 198 tbl.1 (2oo8). Rather than sell tickets by seat
number, Southwest gives customers a place on the boarding line determined by check-in time.
See Boarding the Plane,supra. The first customer on line can choose to sit in any seat. See id. Before
the advent of online check-in, this practice would have encouraged customers to waste time on
early airport arrivals intended to ensure a favorable boarding position. With the advent of online
check-in, this waste has been much reduced, because customers seeking to board early need only
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The information age has also greatly reduced the cost of administering
reservations systems. Restaurants now take reservations online, freeing up staff
for otherjobs.'83 And consumers can preorder products on Amazon, allowing
consumers to avoid the trouble of having to log in repeatedly to determine
whether a product has become available.'5 4 The frustrations experienced by
some Americans ordering groceries online during the coronavirus pandemic
are not to the contrary.'85 The fact that many shoppers were forced to log in
repeatedly to obtain delivery times arose from the failure of online grocers,
86
who did not expect a surge in demand, to implement preordering systems.,
Had grocers put preordering systems in place, consumers could have logged
in once andjoined a queue that would empty as additional delivery times were
added.' 8 7 The fact that even with preordering some consumers would have
had to wait to obtain delivery slots does not reflect an inefficiency of queuing,
but rather the lack of current supply of delivery services. Even if grocers had
dynamically priced delivery services as a means of rationing access, buyers
88
would have had to wait for the slots actually to become available.,
take a moment to reserve a spot when online check-in opens 24 hours in advance of the flight.
Indeed, the online seat reservation methods used by other airlines are an even more efficient
form of online queuing. See Nyquist & McFadden, supra, at 198 tbl. i. The first consumer to book
a seat gets that seat, eliminating entirely the need to wait on line at the gate. See id. (Of course,
price plays a role in seat rationing for these airlines, because unlike Southwest, these airlines
charge based on seat location, with first class seats in the front of the plane selling for higher
prices). The fact that customers tend to line up at the gate anyway in advance of boarding
reserved-seat flights, despite no obvious need to do so, shows that irrational human behavior
should play an important role in any analysis of the efficiency of a rationing system. Taking that
behavior into account, a reservation system may not have an efficiency advantage after all. Indeed,
Southwest's approach may have an additional efficiency advantage. Southwest's requirement that
all fliers commence check-in no earlier than 24 hours before the flight may have an efficiency
benefit relative to reserved seating in that it tends to ensure that those who want an early boarding
position the most get that position. Reserved seating amounts to a queue as well, but some people
may end up at the beginning of the queue because they wanted to purchase their tickets early for
reasons unrelated to the value that they place on seat location. Under Southwest's system, only
those who expressly seek an early boarding position are likely to log in at precisely the 24 -hour
mark in order to claim a high position.
183.

See Kimes, supra note ii,

at 19o.

184.
See Suresh Kotha & Sandip Basu, Amazon and eBay: Online Retailers as Market Makers, in
THE MARKET MAKERS: How RETAILERS ARE RESHAPING THtE GLOBAL ECONOMY 155, 165 (Gary G.
Hamilton et al. eds., 2o i).
185.

See Nicole Lee, Online Grocery Deliveries Are Facing an Unprecedented Stress Test, ENGADGET

(Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.engadget.com/2o20-o3-3o-coronavirus-online-grocery-delivery.html
[https://perma.cc/JP 4 W-JCWP].
186.

See id.

187.

See id.

188. Information age queuing efficiencies are also evident in the purchase of event tickets,
with wasteful box office lines replaced by online ticket sales. See Irwin, supra note Ii. Although
online ticket sales do lead to wasteful efforts to undermine the queue, through expenditures on
software designed to purchase within milliseconds of tickets going on sale, those costs are not
due to the queuing process itself, which requires only the time to log in and attempt a purchase,
but rather to efforts to undermine the queue, which, as described in Section III.B.2, beset ration
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Today, ration pricing may well be more expensive to administer than
queuing, because ration pricing requires investment in the acquisition of a
piece of information that queuing does not require: the particular price that
only a group of consumers sufficiently small to be satisfied by existing supply
are willing to pay.,8 9 To use willingness to pay as a proxy for value, it is
necessary to know enough about the distribution of willingness to pay among
consumers to pick the cutoff price that separates the wealthy few who should
take from those who should not. Queuing does not have this information
requirement. With queuing, the seller simply sells until supply runs out.,9o
The problem of acquiring new information about demand with which to
recalibrate price, which is the heart of dynamic pricing, is eliminated. The
price-rationer can try to minimize information costs by starting to sell at a very
high price, and then lowering price bit by bit until all inventory has sold, but
unless those increments are very small, and all potential buyers are ready to
purchase at the same time, the possibility remains that the owner may
overshoot, reducing price by too far, leading to an excess of demand that must
be resolved in the end by queuing. Thus the additional information
requirement for ration pricing in fact causes ration pricing to shade into the
simpler queuing system.191 The information age has, of course, reduced the
2
information cost of ration pricing, but it has not yet sent that cost to zero.'9
Instantaneous queuing is just the first of many consumer-friendly
alternatives to ration pricing that the information age is likely to create,
because information does not only make it easier to identify and charge a
ration price. It also makes it easier directly to identify desire and route supply
to satisfy it. Consider, for example, the downtown parking problem that a San
Francisco startup tried to solve by occupying parking spots and then selling
them at ration prices. Studies show that perhaps 30 percent of downtown
driving involves searching for parking spaces.193 That is the cost of queuing,
and ration pricing would no doubt have reduced that cost, but at the expense
of consumers.'94 The information age will, however, soon make it possible to

pricing as well as queuing. See McFadden, supra note 51, at 428-29; Ben Sisario, Congress Moves to
Curb Ticket Scalping, Banning Bois Used Online, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2016), https://
[https://pennacc
www.nytimes.com/2o 16/1 2/o8/business/media/ticket-scalping-bots-act.html
/7ESH-B 7 RN].
189.
See KIMBROUG1 I, supra note 2, at 193-98.
o
19 .
See Barzel, supra note 5, at 73-74; Lindsay & Feigenbaum, supra note 178, at 404-o6.
191.
See Lindsay & Feigenbaum, supra note 178, at 405-o6; see also KIMBROUGIt, supra note
2, at 193-98.
See Lynn DeLain & Edward O'Meara, Building a Business Casefor Revenue Management, 2
192.
J. REVENUE & PRICING MGMT. 368, 370 (2oo4) (discussing the costs of implementing a "revenue
management" system).
See Paul Barter, Is30 % of Traffic Actually Searchingfor Parking?, REINVENTING PARKING
193.
(Oct. 7, 2013), https://www.reinventingparking.org/2o13/10/is-3o-of-traffic-actually-searching
-for.html [https://perma.cc/43VL-26YS].
194.
See supraSection II.C.
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eliminate the cost of queuing for parking without embracing ration pricing.
Networked parking meters will guide drivers to available spaces, eliminating
the need for wasteful circling of downtown blocks, and perhaps also prioritize
drivers with special needs. 195 Just as Google Maps has reduced congestion by
routing drivers through unused roads, cities may turn to driving software
dynamically to allocate access to downtown streets to drivers on the most
important business, in lieu of using price to ration access through congestion
pricing schemes. 196 With each new allocative innovation, the argument for the
efficiency of ration pricing will weaken even further, and the argument for
the prohibition of dynamic pricing in response to surges in demand will
strengthen.
IV. BEYOND DYNAMIC PRICING
The heart of the theory of harm in the case against dynamic pricing is
the observation that ration pricing represents pure redistribution of wealth
from consumers to firms:97 But dynamic pricing in response to an
unexpected surge in demand is not the only way in which firms might come
to engage in ration pricing. Firms can ration price as well, with or without the
aid of new technology, when firms know in advance that demand will exceed
supply.,9s In situations such as these, which are common in markets for
unique pieces of real estate, access to congested highways or roads, and space
on high-demand flights, in high-demand hotels, or at high-demand events,
the firm faces the problem whether to ration with prices or queues from the
very beginning when the firm sets its initial prices, rather than later on when
the firm discovers that demand exceeds supply.,99 The response that the
analysis in this Article suggests that the law should give to all examples of
ration pricing, and not just those undertaken through dynamic pricing of

195.

See Trista Lin et al., A Suroey of Smart Parking Solutions, 18 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON

INTELLIGENT TRANSP. SyS. 3229, 3229 (2017).

196.
2019),

SeeRamsi Woodcock, CongestionPricingls Class Warfare. IHere'saBetterldea,
OZY (Mar. 31,

http://www.ozy.com/immodest-proposal/congestion-pricing-is-class-warfare-heres-abetter-idea/93 5o 3 [https://perma.cc/DVA4 -EUVN].
197. See supra Section II.C. Part of the case against dynamic pricing also involves plain old
monopoly pricing. See supra note 140. The arguments that follow infraapply to both parts.
198. SeeVARIAN, supranote i, at 41o-14.
199.
See id.
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unexpected increases in demand, is: "no."2° For the timing of the firm's
20
decision to ration price does not reduce the harm to consumers. '
What prevents the antitrust laws from addressing ration pricing outside
of the context of dynamic pricing, however, is the problem of judicial price
setting, highlighting the uniqueness of the opportunity presented by dynamic
pricing for antitrust action in this area.2 0 2 Antitrust cannot intervene when
firms ration price based upon expected surges in demand, even when firms
employ the same kinds of data and algorithms that firms use to engage in
dynamic pricing of unexpected surges in demand, because antitrust has no
way of knowing whether firms that engage in ration pricing based upon
20
expected surges in demand need their ration prices to cover costs. 3 The

situation is different in the case of dynamic pricing in response to unexpected
increases in demand, because in that context courts can reasonably assume
that the lower price the firm initially sets, before the firm encounters the
unexpected increase in demand, is calculated at least to cover costs. 2 0 4 That

baseline does not exist when firms know in advance that demand will exceed
supply and factor the excess demand into their prices from the beginning.
But while antitrust, with its lack of expertise in price setting, cannot reach
ration pricing in these contexts, rate regulation can.2 0 5 Indeed, rate regulation
6
was conceived with little else in mind.
There is good reason for Congress to consider creating a general rate
regulator to attack this conduct, because in recent years an ardor for ration

200.
See supraSection II.B. The implications of the analysis in this Article for real estate are
particularly interesting. The sale of real estate, the supply of which is of course perpetually fixed,
and the demand for which in urban areas always exceeds supply, to the highest bidder is perhaps

the oldest form of ration pricing. See DAVID RICARDO, TnE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
AND TAXATION 48 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 19 1 1) (photo. reprt. 1933) (1817). Prohibiting ration

pricing of real estate and rationing real estate via queue instead would force owners to sell to the
first bidder willing to pay the owner's opportunity cost, usually the purchase price paid by the
owner plus cost of improvements. See VARIAN, supra note i, at 41 1. Although prohibiting ration

pricing of real estate would no doubt please those who do not own their own homes, doing so
would impoverish a great many others. Real property is the principal store of wealth for the
average American, and home price appreciation the major way in which the middle class
maintains its status. See Zhu Xiao Di et al., Do Ilomeowners Achieve More Iousehold Wealth in the Long
Run?, 16J. HOUSING EcON. 274, 275 (2007); Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Household Wealth
in the United States: Rising Debt and the Middle-Class Squeeze-An Update to 2007, at 8-9 (Levy Econ.

Inst. Bard Coll., Working Paper No. 589, 2oio), available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/
pubs/wp_ 5 89.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SHU- 4 RUS]. To deprive the homeowner of the ability to
enjoy the windfall of home price appreciation would break a perceived commitment on the part
of the government to allow homeowners to extract that value.
201.

See supra Section II.B.

202.

See supra Section II.C.

203.

See supra Section II.C.

2

See supra Section II.C.

4.

205.

See HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 393-94.

2o6.
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatoy Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad
Problem, 9 7 YALELJ. 1017, 1056-58 (1988).
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pricing has swept the country, alongside dynamic pricing.207 Firms that have
adopted dynamic pricing do not stop at dynamically pricing unexpected
surges in demand, but engage in ration pricing of expected surges as well.2os
This may in part be because use of dynamic pricing technology has trained
firms to think more exploitatively about their pricing. But another
explanation may be a change in culture. Disney World, for example, could
have charged higher prices during peak periods before the advent of the
information age, as it takes no computer to divine that lines will be longer in
the summer than the winter, and that at least small increases in price during
the summer season will be profitable.209 Why did Disney not do so? Airlines,
too, always could have charged higher prices for window and aisle seats within
the economy class cabin, as they are starting to do today, even without reams
of data on precisely how much more consumers are willing to pay for those
seats.2' o Why did airlines not do so? The fact that these firms chose not to
attempt to ration price until recently cannot be explained by the profit
motive, and may instead reflect the demise of firms' former commitment to
balancing the competing claims of workers, investors, managers, and indeed
consumers to the wealth generated by the firm.2' ' Firms once pursued pricing
strategies that were good enough for the purpose of covering costs, but which
were not intended to optimize against consumers. 2 2 By contrast, the present
maxim of corporate action is that investors and managers must take all in
order for the economy to function properly.213
The result of this new attitude toward ration pricing cannot be greater
economic efficiency, because ration pricing, as shown in Parts II and III, has
nothing to do with efficiency. Instead, the result is both redistribution of
wealth from consumers to firms, and, more perniciously, the promulgation of
the bad civic lesson that dignity resides in wealth rather than in membership
in the community.214 For ration pricing not only redistributes wealth from

those consumers who pay higher prices to firms, but also gives the rich priority
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access to scarce resources, and excludes the poor.2 '5 The lesson that raion
pricing teaches about access is all the more profound because many of the
industries that, due to scarcity and excess demand, are peculiarly suited to
ration pricing, and have adopted it in recent years, are infrastructural,
including housing, transportation, and events.- 6 When ration pricing
allocates access to them based on wealth, it sends a clear message about
belonging.217 The fact that governments have failed to appreciate this
problem, and have instead embraced ration pricing themselves in the highway
and congestion areas reinforces the impression that the problem runs to
culture.218 Of course the rich have always had priority in private markets in
the sense that only those who can pay the costs of production ever have the
chance to buy a product, and ration pricing does not change that.219 But
ration pricing gives the wealthiest within this group priority.2o It is no longer
good enough to be able to afford a product, one must now be the richest of
those who can afford the product in order to have it.
Because the choice to ration based on wealth is not driven by efficiency,
the symbolic meaning of the decision to use that criterion is rendered all the
stronger, and more harmful to the integrity of the community. It is for this
reason that many governments have tended not only to discourage ration
pricing with respect to the infrastructures in which it is now becoming
popular, but to subsidize access to those infrastructures, to ensure that wealth
would play no role in access, even for those unable to pay the costs of
production.221 The deregulatory movement has curbed these impulses, and
222
the spread of ration pricing has taken policy to the other extreme.
V.

CONCLUSION

The information age has created a mismatch between the nearinstantaneous timescales over which firms can now adjust their prices and the
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much longer timescales over which firms must still wait to adjust their output.
As a result, when a firm encounters an unanticipated surge in demand, one
that will exhaust the firm's inventories, the firm can raise prices but cannot
increase its output to satisfy the extra demand. That is a recipe for ration
pricing, the use of price to allocate a good in short supply to the consumers
with the highest willingness to pay for the good. When deployed to respond
to an unexpected surge in demand, ration pricing always amounts to abovecost pricing and therefore always harms consumers, because the firm would
presumably have chosen the initial price the firm charged before learning of
the surge in demand and dynamically adjusting prices in response, to cover
costs. It follows that any dynamic price increases the firm pursues must raise
prices above costs.
This certainty of harm to consumers, combined with the fact that
dynamic pricing can be banned without putting courts in the position of
having to set prices, creates a basis for treating dynamic pricing as a per se
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Liability should not attach,
however, if the ration pricing to which dynamic pricing gives rise represents
the most efficient means by which to ration access to goods in short supply.
But there is no reason to think that price is any better at allocating scarce
resources to those who value them the most than is the alternative of queuing.
Both allocate using imperfect proxies for value: willingness to pay, in the case
of price, and willingness to get on line first, in the case of queuing. And in the
information age the burden of queuing has been driven almost to zero,
because now waiting on line takes only the time needed to log into a website
and check to see whether a product is available. Dynamic pricing in response
to unexpected demand surges is therefore unambiguously harmful to
consumers and should be made per se illegal.

